THE FUTURE OF SEA POWER

The Evolving Dynamic of Armed Maritime Crime and Terrorism in the Modern Era | 49
Terrorism
Historically the world’s oceans have not been a major locus of extremist activity. Indeed
according to the Global Terrorism Database, of the 98,000 incidents recorded during
the past 40 years, only 199 (0.2 per cent) have taken place at sea or been directed at
maritime platforms. 33 To be sure part of the reason for this empirical paucity stems
from the fact that many organisations have not been located near to coastal regions or
have lacked the necessary means to extend their physical reach beyond purely local
theatres. However, there are also several fundamental requirements for conducting
effective maritime strikes that due to limited resources have traditionally been beyond
the operational ambit of most militant extremists available to terrorist groups. Notably
these include possession of mariner skills, access to appropriate assault and transport
vehicles, and expertise in certain specialist capabilities (for example, surface and
underwater demolition techniques). 34
Very much related to this is the inherently conservative nature of terrorists in terms of
their chosen attack modalities. Precisely because groups are constrained by ceilings
in finance and skill-sets, most have deliberately adhered to tried and tested methods
that are known to work, which offer a reasonably high chance of success and whose
consequences can be relatively easily predicted. 35 More specifically, in a world of finite
human and material assets, the costs and unpredictability associated with expanding to
the maritime realm have typically trumped any potential benefits that might be garnered
from initiating such a change in operational direction.
A further consideration has to do with the nature of potential sea-based targets
themselves. Because these platforms largely remain out of sight, they do not tend to
be at the forefront of public interest, something that is particularly true of those within
the commercial realm. Moreover unlike shopping malls, sports stadiums, train stations
and hotels, most maritime venues neither abut major centres of population nor are they
easily accessible to the media. 36 Attacking them is, thus, far less likely to attract the
same level of attention or immediacy as striking on land (the one notable exception
being passenger ships, which is discussed below). This general lack of visibility is
important, as at root, terrorism is a psychological tactic that can only be effective if it is
able to demonstrate and communicate its relevance through immediately apparent acts
of violence. 37
Current Concerns
In spite of these considerations, the potential spectre of maritime terrorism remains
a concern. Why? First, there has been a modest yet discernible spike in high-profile
terrorist attacks at sea over the past 15 years. Notable examples include the suicide
strike on USS Cole as it was refuelling at the port of Aden (2000), the bombing of M/V
Limburg in the Gulf of Aden (2002), the partial sinking of SuperFerry 14 in the Philippines
(2004), the assault on M/V MStar in the Strait of Hormuz (2010) and, most recently, the
RPG shelling of COSCO Asia as it transited the Suez Canal (2013). 38