THE FUTURE OF SEA POWER

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The Future of Sea Power
journalistic tendency to refer to submerged features that have been reclaimed as if they
were islands privileged to have a full exclusive economic zone. This imprecision may
play into the hands of aspiring claimants, but descriptions of ‘islands’, when none are to
be seen, complicates the dialogue, particularly when it comes to freedom of navigation.
Carl Thayer’s argumentation about reclamation is particularly compelling in this regard.
He maintains that the process is not one of reclamation, but of construction. Further, he
opines that ‘China’s assertions of sovereign rights in these circumstances represent a
form of legal alchemy in which China attempts to convert submerged features and rocks
into naturally-formed islands.’ 49 The general trend over the years has been to enclose
more and more of the world’s oceans, extending coastal state jurisdiction farther and
farther out to sea. This trend is seen as threatening freedom of navigation, and the US
Navy has been particularly dedicated to upholding this freedom as the waters of one of
the world’s most important semi-enclosed seas become increasingly contested. 50 Sadly,
the members of ASEAN have been like so many deer in the headlights when it comes to
articulating and, even more importantly, enforcing codes of conduct in the South China
Sea. The organisation continues to espouse work on a new and more comprehensive
Code of Conduct, but internal divisions within ASEAN, encouraged in part by China,
bureaucratic foot dragging, and a lack of enthusiasm on China’s part have meant that,
despite years of statements on the importance of a full-blown code, ASEAN has nothing
to show for its efforts. 51
Chinese ‘salami slicing’ tactics constitute a constant dilemma for claimants and other
maritime powers. 52 Are they to invite hostilities with China over inconsequential
sandbars? 53 Failure to do so, however, means the steady erosion of the maritime order.
Should maritime states be party to such subversion? The stakes are equally high in
the East China Sea. There, the Chinese exhibited no interest in the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands, lying northeast of Taiwan, until the early 1970s, following a United Nations
report that indicated the probability of oil and gas deposits in the vicinity of these rocky
outcrops. Securing an assured source of fossil fuel was an existential consideration for
China as the state’s appetite for energy began to soar. At the same time, there was
mounting concern in China about food security, as fish stocks in the waters off its coasts
began to diminish alarmingly. The Japanese were somewhat less concerned, initially,
because they relied heavily on distant water fisheries, but the growth of Chinese naval
power and the constraining effect of LOSC led Japan to revise its East China Sea policies
markedly. This was a painful, awkward, and even dangerous process. Clashes between
Chinese and Japanese vessels in the approaches to the Senkaku/Diaoyu enflamed
national sentiments on many occasions, but fortunately, as James Manicom’s analysis
has revealed, saner heads normally prevailed. 54 That said, the room for error continues
to shrink, and hostilities by miscalculation are not inconceivable, particularly when face
and national passions are involved. In fact, Liff and Erickson cite the fact that Chinese
coastguard vessels entered Japanese territorial waters (that is to say, within 12nm of the
coast) over 350 times between September 2012 and May 2015. 55