THE FUTURE OF SEA POWER

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The Future of Sea Power
Third, grinding poverty and chronic governance voids in Somalia following the collapse
of the Siad Barre dictatorship in 1993 provided an ideal context for the systemic growth
of hijacking off the Horn of Africa that saw its zenith between 2005 and 2012. 27 As noted
above, international naval patrols in the Gulf of Aden, target-hardening and the more
risk-sensitive attitude of ships transiting these waters, has greatly helped to ameliorate
the problem of illicit vessel boarding and seizures in this part of the world, at least in
the short-term. However, these measures are largely premised on the faulty assumption
that this particular manifestation of armed maritime crime can best be best contained
at its endpoint - on the sea. Until more concerted attention is given to addressing the
land-based ‘push’ factors that lie at the root of maritime crime in Somalia (the source for
virtually all of the attacks that have occurred in the region), a resurgence of incidents
cannot be ruled out.
Fourth and stemming from the above, there has been increased willingness of owneroperators
to pay ever-larger ransoms. Whereas in the early 2000s negotiated settlements
averaged around $150,000, by 2012 they were ranging from $4-5 million. 28 Although
attempts have been made to outlaw the payment of ransoms by linking them to material
support for terrorism these efforts have so far been unsuccessful. Indeed, in February
2011, a UK court of appeal ruled that monies extorted from shipping companies were
actually recoverable as a ‘sue and labour’ expense. 29 The shipping industry, for its part,
appears to have an unwritten rule to settle as quickly as possible, calculating that even
million-dollar payouts are preferable to losing entire vessels and manifests. 30
Fifth has been the global proliferation of arms. The range of weapons currently available
on the international black market is truly enormous, including everything from pistols
and assault rifles to heavy calibre machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG). 31
Many of these munitions can be procured relatively cheaply (which opens up a large
buyer’s market), providing maritime criminals with the means to operate on a higher
and significantly more lethal and sophisticated level. As Noel Choong, the Director of
the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur, remarks: ‘Five to six years ago, when
pirates attacked, they used machetes, knives and pistols. Today they come equipped
with AK-47s, M-16s, rifle grenades and RPGs.’ 32
An underlying denominator in most, if not all, of these factors is money. Shipowners
have inadvertently made their vessels vulnerable to attack due to cost considerations.
At the same time, they have provided a very strong incentive (through ransoms) for
impoverished communities to engage in maritime crime. Littoral states have been
unwilling or unable to secure their coastlines due to a lack of resources. Concurrently,
the competitive nature of the global arms market has availed even poorly resourced
gangs to obtain the necessary hardware to contemplate ever more audacious and
complex operations.