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Principles of Federal Appropriations Law - US Government ...

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Chapter 2<br />

The Legal Framework<br />

the phrase is clear in one part <strong>of</strong> the statute and in others<br />

doubtful or obscure, it is in the latter case given the same<br />

construction as in the former.”<br />

A corollary to this principle is that when Congress uses a different term, it<br />

intends a different meaning. E.g., 56 Comp. Gen. 655, 658 (1977) (term<br />

“taking line” presumed to have different meaning than “taking area,” which<br />

had been used in several other sections in the same statute).<br />

Several different canons <strong>of</strong> construction revolve around these seemingly<br />

straightforward notions. Before discussing some <strong>of</strong> them, it is important to<br />

note once more that these canons, like most others, may or may not make<br />

sense to apply in particular settings. Indeed, the basic canon that the same<br />

words have the same meaning in a statute is itself subject to exceptions. In<br />

Cleveland Indians Baseball Club, the Court cautioned:<br />

“Although we generally presume that identical words used<br />

in different parts <strong>of</strong> the same act are intended to have the<br />

same meaning, … the presumption is not rigid, and the<br />

meaning [<strong>of</strong> the same words] well may vary with the<br />

purposes <strong>of</strong> the law.”<br />

532 U.S. at 213 (citations and quotation marks omitted). To drive the point<br />

home, the Court quoted the following admonition from a law review article:<br />

“The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two<br />

or more legal rules, and so in connection with more than<br />

one purpose, has and should have precisely the same scope<br />

in all <strong>of</strong> them … has all the tenacity <strong>of</strong> original sin and must<br />

constantly be guarded against.”<br />

Id. Of course, all bets are <strong>of</strong>f if the statute clearly uses the same word<br />

differently in different places. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,<br />

343 (1997) (“[o]nce it is established that the term ‘employees’ includes<br />

former employees in some sections, but not in others, the term standing<br />

alone is necessarily ambiguous”).<br />

Two canons are frequently applied to the use <strong>of</strong> similar—but not identical—<br />

words in a statute when they are part <strong>of</strong> the same phrase. These canons are<br />

known as “ejusdem generis,” or “<strong>of</strong> the same kind,” and “noscitur a sociis,”<br />

loosely meaning that words are known by the company they keep.<br />

Page 2-90 GAO-04-261SP <strong>Appropriations</strong> <strong>Law</strong>—Vol. I

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