Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin - Federation of American ...

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be able to tell you what items are on the CCIR. If
these lists are not inherently known or understood,
then the risk is that the focus will be lost in training
and operations.
Identify non-critical tasks. Tasks which are not critical
have to be explicitly identified. This is the hardest
task, as well as the task that is rarely done. To ensure
that you do not focus on everything, it is wise to determine
those things that can be handled by a standing
operating procedure (SOP), or are tasks of lesser
importance (such as Intelligence Requirements, or
IRs). It’s also not a bad idea to identify those tasks
that simply will not be done because they detract
from the real priorities. There will never be enough intelligence
assets to provide surveillance everywhere,
so it makes sense to identify where there will be intelligence
gaps. You cannot train on everything, so
it is best to identify those areas you simply will not
commit training resources and time to. Commanders
also have to be involved in this process. In some
cases, this will involve risk; in other cases, it is a case
of common sense. If commanders don’t get involved
in determining priorities and where risk is assumed,
subordinates will do it by necessity.
At the monthly G3/S3 conference at the division
headquarters, the division Commander addressed
the S3s throughout the division and told them,
“I know I’ve given you a hundred balls to juggle
and keep up in the air—but you don’t have the
authority to drop a single one of them.” For
the remainder of the CG’s tenure, the standard
greeting among S3s in the division was “hide the
dropped balls.”
Reassess continually. Priorities change, and so our
lists of priorities must be continually updated. METLs
must be assessed continually—not just for training
status but also for relevance to the wartime mission.
PIRs and CCIRs must also be assessed continually,
as some requirements are fulfilled and other requirements
become more important. The assessment
must be continual, and there has to be a set time to
address whether or not the priorities are still correct.
Remind constantly. Even though staff officers
should be able to recite the METL off the top of their
heads, it’s also best to keep constant reminders evident.
PIRs should be posted in prominent places.
This helps to ensure that the reassessment is continual
and provide a constant reminder of the priorities
in the unit.
Mission Essential Task List (METL)
Field Manual 7-0, Training the Force, provides the
doctrinal basis for determining the METL. Paragraph
3-1 in FM 7-0 states “the commander must identify those
tasks that are essential to accomplishing the organization’s
wartime operational mission.” Tasks are kept to a
minimum; paragraph 3-3 states that “the METL development
process reduces the number of tasks the organization
must train and focuses the organization’s training
efforts on the most important collective training tasks required
to accomplish the mission”; paragraph 3-16 states
that the commander “narrows down the list of all derived
tasks to those tasks critical for mission accomplishment.”
Doctrine also addresses those tasks that are “urgent, but
not critical” in paragraph 4-16:
Senior leaders at all echelons eliminate
nonessential activities that detract from METLbased
training. In peacetime, however, certain
activities occur that do not directly relate to an
organization’s wartime mission but are important
to other Army priorities. Senior leaders limit
these peacetime activities to the maximum extent
possible. Those that are absolutely essential
are included in long-range planning documents.
When assigned these activities, commanders
continually seek mission related training
opportunities.
Finally, there must be constant reassessment and reminding
of the METL within an organization. Paragraph
3-4 states that applying the METL development “provides
a forum for professional discussion and leader development
among senior, subordinate and adjacent (peer)
commanders concerning the linkage between mission
and training; enables subordinate commanders and key
NCOs to crosswalk collective, leader and individual tasks
to the mission; and leads to ‘buy-in’ and commitment of
unit leaders to the organization’s training plan.”
Commander’s Critical Information
Requirements (CCIR)
Field Manual 3-0, Operations, and Field Manual 5-0,
Army Planning and Orders Production, provide the doctrinal
basis for determining CCIRs. Paragraph 11-39 in
FM 3-0 states, “the commander’s critical information requirements
are elements of information required by com-
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