Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin - Federation of American ...

leader is detained. Fusion of this information allows for
prioritizing various target personalities and target areas.
As the targeting cell determines the relative importance
of various targets, it also must determine the best means
for addressing each. Inappropriate targeting decisions
can have major negative effects. For instance, an area
supportive of insurgent activity may be easily won over
with a CA project or turned even more pro-insurgency by
a cordon and search operation. In another area, a CMO’s
approach may only embolden the insurgents. The correct
course of action must be taken with each target, and it
must be focused on the effects of the course of action.
There are a wide variety of ways a target can be prosecuted
in order to achieve the positive effects:
Target Personalities
� Capture or kill.
� Threaten (must be credible and backed by appropriate
action).
� Subvert.
� Offer surrender terms.
� Negotiate terms for normalized relations.
� Use IO to build or undermine legitimacy.
� Conduct leader engagement to build rapport.
Target Areas
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Deliberate attack.
Counter-battery.
Cordon and search operations.
Ambushes.
Establish outposts.
Patrolling.
Provide support to security forces.
Distribute PSYOP materials
Build or rebuild infrastructure.
Provide job programs.
At the end of the Decision phase, there is a prioritized
list of targets and a recommended course of action associated
with each. As the Detect phase is similar to IPB,
the Decide phase is similar to an abbreviated form of the
Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). Fragmentary
Orders by the S3 planner often come about as a result of
the Decide phase of the targeting process. It should be
noted that meetings between indigenous leadership and
commanders must also be targeted. The targeting cell
should identify and prioritize who to meet with and how often.
They should also look at the desired effects for each
meeting with local leadership and have a basic plan in
place for how to achieve the desired effects. Intelligence
personnel support this by providing background information
on the personnel who will be at each meeting.
Deliver
The Deliver phase of COIN targeting differs only from
conventional operations in that a very wide variety of
operations are undertaken. In order to support these,
intelligence personnel must adapt the collection plan appropriately.
Assess
The Assess phase differs from conventional operations
in many ways. Intelligence personnel must look for reporting
that indicates the effects on insurgent networks and
the community due to an operation. Depending on these
effects, commanders may choose to expand the operation,
maintain it as is, halt it, change to a branch or sequel
plan, or try to contain the damage of a mistake. Metrics
often include—
� Changes in atmospherics.
� Changes in intelligence provided by individuals or
groups.
� Changes in the economic or political situation of an
area.
� Increases or decreases in enemy actions.
� Captured or killed enemy personnel.
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Captured equipment and documents.
Raids often provide a wealth of information that must
be rapidly exploited. Intelligence personnel in the brigade
often must be prepared to do a great deal of exploitation
work. Though arduous, it is worth the time committed.
Exploitation of documents and detainees often provides
intelligence of enormous value on the structure of local insurgent
organizations and may create a “snowball” effect
whereby additional insurgents can be captured.
Conclusion
Maneuver brigades have a unique position when involved
in COIN operations. By doctrine, a unit should always
understand what is occurring two echelons above it
and two echelons below. The brigade is therefore monitoring
what goes on at the company level and at the corps/
theater level. In many ways, this makes the brigade staff
a link between day-to-day tactical operations line soldiers
and the theater-level campaign. For intelligence personnel,
it means they are looking at everything from local insurgents
to major regional financiers and organizers who
may cross international boundaries.
July - September 2005 53