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Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin - Federation of American ...

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with others involved in targeting in order to ensure they<br />

maintain a common operating picture.<br />

The COIN Targeting Process<br />

The phases <strong>of</strong> the targeting process vary from conventional<br />

doctrine. Rather than Decide, Detect, Deliver,<br />

Assess, the process <strong>of</strong>ten changes to Detect, Decide,<br />

Deliver, Assess. This alteration <strong>of</strong> the process was briefly<br />

outlined by Captain Brian Gellman in “Lessons Learned<br />

from OIF: An SF Battalion S2’s Perspective.” 1 <strong>Intelligence</strong><br />

personnel in Iraq generally detect a wide variety <strong>of</strong> targets<br />

at any given time. They have to work with other personnel<br />

involved in the targeting process in order to prioritize<br />

which targets to expend resources on, how to expend<br />

those resources, and to make changes to the collection<br />

plan in order to support the brigade’s priorities.<br />

A Soldier passes out pro-coalition flyers to the citizens <strong>of</strong> Fallujah,<br />

Iraq, during Operation Salm.<br />

Detect<br />

The Detect phase, constantly ongoing and similar to <strong>Intelligence</strong><br />

Preparation <strong>of</strong> the Battlefield (IPB), is done on<br />

a continual basis and requires a great deal <strong>of</strong> analytical<br />

work by tactical intelligence personnel. The S2 and the<br />

Analysis and Control Team (ACT) (in legacy brigades that<br />

still have an ACT) have to go through reams <strong>of</strong> all-source<br />

intelligence reporting to determine the validity <strong>of</strong> threats<br />

and how important different potential targets actually are.<br />

This requires an understanding <strong>of</strong> tribal networks, social<br />

networks, insurgent networks, insurgent actions, and<br />

community atmospherics. Products that aid in this are link<br />

diagrams and “target folders” containing summaries <strong>of</strong> information<br />

on a target and the reporting associated with<br />

the target.<br />

Complicating the task is the fact that people will make<br />

false claims against individuals they do not like and may<br />

also misrepresent themselves as having more influence<br />

than they actually do. This means that multiple source<br />

reporting is necessary to ensure that a target is really a<br />

target. In addition, there are multiple kinds <strong>of</strong> targets that<br />

can be identified, and not all <strong>of</strong> them are the enemy. The<br />

brigade will also have to target its CMOs in order to ensure<br />

they have the desired effects. The kinds <strong>of</strong> targets a<br />

unit will prosecute can be broadly differentiated as target<br />

personalities and target areas.<br />

Target Personalities (also called HVTs or High Value Individuals)<br />

� Kinetic targets: insurgents or leaders who can be captured<br />

or killed.<br />

Non-kinetic targets: personnel who can be engaged<br />

through negotiation, meetings, contracts, information<br />

operations (IO), etc.<br />

Target Areas<br />

A technique for simplifying the Detect phase is to split<br />

up targeting tasks by echelon. For instance, a maneuver<br />

battalion would be responsible for tracking target personalities<br />

such as cell leaders and below, localized community<br />

or city leaders and below, and area targets within their<br />

area <strong>of</strong> operations (AO). The brigade would have responsibility<br />

for tracking insurgents from the cell leader to facilitator<br />

or regional leader level, community leaders up to<br />

the provincial level, and area targets that cross battalion<br />

boundaries. This separation <strong>of</strong> tracking greatly lessens<br />

the load <strong>of</strong> battalion and brigade S2 sections and ensures<br />

that they are still capable <strong>of</strong> supporting the targeting decisions<br />

<strong>of</strong> their commanders.<br />

It is also very beneficial to have an <strong>of</strong>ficer or noncommissioned<br />

<strong>of</strong>ficer in the S2 section or the ACT who does<br />

targeting and plans full time. This soldier should not be<br />

responsible for day-to-day operations, but focused completely<br />

on identifying and keeping track <strong>of</strong> targets. This<br />

allows them the time to sift through the large amount <strong>of</strong><br />

reporting coming in daily, analyzing it appropriately, continuously<br />

fusing the information with other members <strong>of</strong> the<br />

targeting cell, and considering the next move <strong>of</strong> enemy<br />

personnel. Poor target identification leads to wasted effort<br />

by soldiers in the field as they raid the wrong house or<br />

July - September 2005 51<br />

�<br />

� Areas controlled by insurgents.<br />

� Areas where insurgents commonly operate.<br />

� CMO opportunities, areas where the population may<br />

be receptive to CA projects or PSYOP.

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