If the evil is coming, shut the door...

12 The Niles | Commentary
Why South
Sudanese “need”
firearms
by Jok Madut Jok
D
ecades of civil war left in their wake gigantic
challenges for both Sudan and South Sudan.
The most daunting of these was the militarisation
of many communities, the ubiquity of firearms
and widespread communal violence fanned by easy
access to light weapons and small arms.
Nothing speaks more loudly about the impact
of the north-south war on South Sudanese
communities than the number of guns it left
in the hands of civilians and their use in communal
feuds, crime and revenge.
Weapons alone do not kill, however. They
only kill because human beings use them. It is
therefore important to think about what is driving
this violence, and why people feel the need to
acquire guns.
Social shifts are underway, forcing many people
to reach for firearms. The starting point for this
shift was the Sudanese government’s use of a counterinsurgency
tactic of recruiting, training and arming
young South Sudanese and deploying them to
fight against the Sudan People’s Liberation Army
(SPLA) and against their own people, a kind
of war by proxy. This tactic had an immediate
consequence: It seriously damaged ethnic relations
and, in turn, these wrecked relations were more
likely to be settled by using guns. The traditional
ethos was utterly abandoned under the weight
of the anonymous firearm killings, as opposed
to killings that once involved face-to-face confrontation
and spears.
The next step in the development of this
gun-focused subculture was the SPLA’s encouragement
of civilians to acquire weapons to protect
themselves against Sudan’s government-sponsored
militias, especially against the Popular Defense
Force (PDF) made up of the Baggara from Darfur
and Kordofan. This wreaked havoc in northern
parts of Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile regions.
The third step was the growing trend of cattle
rustling, which became rampant in seven out
of the ten states of the country. Many young men
acquired arms to protect their livestock and retrieve
their stolen cattle.
The fourth driver were various splits within
the SPLA, beginning in 1991 when Riek Machar
broke away and tried to form his own wing of
the organisation. This quickly took on an ethnic
colour, with Machar, a Nuer being supported
by other Nuer, which sparked the notorious Bor
massacre. Meanwhile, the leader of the SPLA,
the late John Garang, was mainly supported by
his Dinka ethnic group. Throughout the 1990s
the SPLA continued to clash with militias. Some
of the weapons, sourced from supportive countries
by the SPLA, found their way into the hands of
the civilians. This had deadly consequences: The
guns ushered in a new level of viciousness and
destruction in comparison to when these ethnic
groups used to fight with clubs and spears.
The last step in the development of this new
gun culture was the 2005 Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) itself. Armed groups were
encouraged to join the SPLA, the new national
defense force, and many of them sold their weapons
for cash or cows. These were keenly acquired by the
would-be cattle rustlers among the civilians.
When South Sudan became independent in
2011, people urgently wanted security, especially
communities living in regions worst affected by
the war. So it was only natural that the government
unveiled massive civilian disarmament campaigns.
Ethnic divides hampered these, in particular deepseated
fears that other groups might be better
armed. This suspicion meant most people either
ignored the disarmament efforts or, worse still,
acquired more weapons.
Civilian disarmament has been generally rated
as a failure or a limited success. Problems included
the heavy-handed approach, which deterred people
from coming forward with their guns. Meanwhile,
they made the mistake of not simultaneously
disarming competing groups.
But the biggest problem was the assumption
that removal of guns alone would solve South Sudan’s
security problems. This ignores one obvious fact:
It is not about the guns, but rather why people feel
they need weapons in the first place. If these drivers
of violence are not tackled, if there are no guarantees
of security and justice, and if citizens suspect
that the state has a total monopoly of the legitimate
use of force, then the South Sudanese will continue
to find ways of getting hold of guns. Far from being
a subculture, the continued use of firearms and
their spread among civilians are rooted in the lack
of justice and state protection, suspicion, ethnic
feuds and how easy guns are to acquire.
Battling unlicensed
weapons
in Darfur
by Mohamed Hilaly
D
arfur, a region roughly the size of Spain, has more
than two million unlicensed firearms. A bid to
register and mark these weapons kicked off a year
ago, viewed as a step towards disarmament. It has
yet, however, to make any real headway.
Keeping tabs on these illegal firearms is a
massive task. But before that can happen, several
unavoidable issues need to be resolved to shore up
local support for the unpopular project.
Development is the first stumbling block, and
a key prerequisite if the process is to succeed. The
absence of the most basic elements for life means
that people take up arms to make a living through
cattle raiding or looting the property of others.
So far there has been no effective strategy for
improving development in Darfur.
And development is not just about building
schools, supplying stationery, digging boreholes
or providing medicine. It goes deeper: It is related
to production and, in particular, to using natural
resources to foster economic and social benefits,
by creating job opportunities and a fair distribution
of wealth. On this point, progress is vital, not
least against the backdrop of the devastating war,
which has dominated the region for decades.
Another problem is instilling trust. Until now,
the majority of participants in the registration and
marking process are believed to be civilians affiliated
to the government. Even given their official links,
these participants are said not to have registered
all their firearms, only admitting to owning an
estimated one out of five.
This obviously undermines the credibility of
the government, also rattling confidence among
those close to power.
To remedy the prevailing suspicion, the government
would need to work with all parties, including
all Darfur movements. Signing a comprehensive
peace agreement should not be a prerequisite to
such involvement. In fact, excluding these groups
will undermine the process. Similarly civil and
popular leaderships that oppose the ruling regime
in Khartoum must be included. After all, if all
participants are affiliated to the regime, the process
will lack credibility, especially among the local Darfur
groups who long fought against the ruling party.
The government needs to face up to these problems.
Failure to do so will end up, once again, wasting
time and money, without benefiting the people
of Darfur, the victims of years of violent conflict.
Comments
Failing
to disarm
Jonglei
by Francis Michael
D
isarmament was never going to be easy in
Jonglei, one of South Sudan’s most violent states.
But the process of trying to remove weapons
from a population which is armed to the hilt, has
fared worse than even the most pessimistic
predictions.
The disarmament campaign instigated by the
government in March 2012, aimed to foster peace,
but in reality unleashed a storm of violence and
human rights atrocities in South Sudan’s largest
state. Reports from Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International indicate citizens have been
tortured, raped and killed by soldiers from the
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) conducting
the disarmament.
Victims described being beaten by soldiers and
having their heads submerged in water to extract
information about weapons. Others spoke of how
soldiers looted their property and destroyed crops.
These brutal tactics are a key reason for the
disarmament campaigns failure. Observers say the
soldiers riled locals by disarming some communities
of their weapons while not disarming others,
creating a volatile imbalance of power, fuelling
insecurity, and undermining any confidence in
the government.