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Building a U.S. Coast Guard for the 21st Century - Center for ...

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The upshot, according to GAO: “Acquisition decisions <strong>for</strong> certain assets are being<br />

made without having completed some key acquisition documentation in light of<br />

what <strong>the</strong> <strong>Coast</strong> <strong>Guard</strong> views as pressing operational needs.” 70<br />

Poor acquisition and financial management leading to capacity deficits as<br />

legacy assets are set to be decommissioned<br />

Acquisition difficulties not only impact <strong>the</strong> cost of assets but, critically, <strong>the</strong>ir scheduled<br />

delivery date, and thus <strong>the</strong> ability to replace legacy assets in order to maintain<br />

operational capacity. As noted in <strong>the</strong> fiscal constraints section, as <strong>the</strong> service begins<br />

decommissioning significant assets this year, delays in <strong>the</strong> scheduled delivery of<br />

new vessels and aircraft meant to replace aging assets are leading to increased maintenance<br />

costs <strong>for</strong> legacy assets, as well as operational capacity deficits.<br />

Final asset delivery estimates <strong>for</strong> critical plat<strong>for</strong>ms such as <strong>the</strong> Medium Endurance<br />

Cutter, National Security Cutter, and Maritime Patrol Aircraft are 17 months,<br />

24 months, and 57 months behind <strong>the</strong>ir 2007 baseline estimates, respectively.<br />

Meanwhile, delayed deployment of <strong>the</strong> service’s smaller projects such as small<br />

boat projects and UAV programs reduces <strong>the</strong> intended short-term capabilities of<br />

larger assets such as <strong>the</strong> NSCs. 71<br />

Broader U.S. military procurement problems<br />

Defense acquisition programs are inherently complex endeavors that involve a<br />

multitude of actors to produce assets and manage <strong>the</strong>ir production and oversee<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir financing, among o<strong>the</strong>r key functions. Such an environment creates opportunities<br />

<strong>for</strong> fraud, waste, and abuse; inefficiencies and error abound as a result of<br />

<strong>the</strong>se complexities.<br />

Lack of internal capacity to manage acquisition projects in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Coast</strong> <strong>Guard</strong> is not<br />

merely a <strong>Coast</strong> <strong>Guard</strong> problem, but a problem shared by all <strong>the</strong> services <strong>the</strong>mselves.<br />

As a House Armed Services Committee Report noted in 2007:<br />

Simply put, <strong>the</strong> Department of Defense acquisition process is broken. The ability of<br />

<strong>the</strong> Department to conduct <strong>the</strong> large scale acquisitions required to ensure our future<br />

national security is a concern of <strong>the</strong> committee. The rising costs and leng<strong>the</strong>ning<br />

35 <strong>Center</strong> <strong>for</strong> American Progress | <strong>Building</strong> a U.S. <strong>Coast</strong> <strong>Guard</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>21st</strong> <strong>Century</strong><br />

Acquisition<br />

decisions <strong>for</strong><br />

certain assets<br />

are being made<br />

without having<br />

completed some<br />

key acquisition<br />

documentation<br />

in light of what<br />

<strong>the</strong> <strong>Coast</strong> <strong>Guard</strong><br />

views as pressing<br />

operational needs.

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