Building a U.S. Coast Guard for the 21st Century - Center for ...

Moreover, GAO reports that the Coast Guard has noted “role ambiguity…due
to the combination of both old and new organizational components operating
concurrently.” One conspicuous example has been instances in the recent past
where Coast Guard personnel who have been relocated to other command areas
of responsibility remain focused on their previous command area. 80
While the Coast Guard’s operations in Haiti in early 2010 highlighted the consequences
of the service’s aging fleet, previous operations in response to the attacks
of September 11 and Hurricane Katrina in particular also revealed organizational
challenges that make the case for command restructuring. According to GAO,
Coast Guard operations during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 “highlighted the need
for enhanced standardization across the service and more centralized logistics
and asset management.” 81 Overall, the Coast Guard performed admirably in its
response to Hurricane Katrina; well over half of the 60,000 people left stranded by
the hurricane were rescued by Coast Guard personnel.
But as NAPA notes in its Coast Guard Modernization Study, while the Coast
Guard’s performance in response to Katrina was exceptional, “the lessons learned
from these historic responses revealed gaps in the agency’s ability to surge a
massive number of interoperable forces in place within hours; provide logistical
support for sustained operations; and to quickly assemble adaptive force packages
to meet the needs of missions requiring those types of forces.” 82
Most notably, the Coast Guard experienced logistical complications, such as difficulties
securing fuel, alongside personnel security issues and communications
challenges during its post-Katrina operations. The post-hurricane environment
proved so disruptive that the service’s communications networks could not be
relied upon. In some instances Coast Guardsmen and women distributed satellite
phones and cell phones to mitigate communications infrastructure breakdowns.
In other cases, they relied on text messages and personal email accounts when the
Coast Guard’s data network was down. 83
In order to correct these inefficiencies, redundancies, and gaps in capability,
the leadership of the Coast Guard has proposed establishing four new organizational
entities:
• The Deputy Commandant for Mission Support, or DCMS
• The Deputy Commandant for Operations, or DCO
• Operations Command, or OPCOM
• Force Readiness Command, or FORCECOM
40 Center for American Progress | Building a U.S. Coast Guard for the 21st Century