Insurance Contract Law Issues Paper 2 Warranties - Law Commission
Insurance Contract Law Issues Paper 2 Warranties - Law Commission
Insurance Contract Law Issues Paper 2 Warranties - Law Commission
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Waiver and Affirmation<br />
7.154 The changes we have proposed to section 33 of the MIA 1906 would have<br />
consequences for the law on waiver. The 1906 Act specifically states that “a<br />
breach of warranty may be waived by the insurer”. 51 However, since the House of<br />
Lords decision in The Good Luck, 52 there has been a considerable academic<br />
debate over how breaches of warranty may be waived. 53<br />
7.155 In English contract law, there are two ways in which a party may be taken to have<br />
waived their rights when faced with the other party’s repudiatory breach. 54 The<br />
first way is by making a choice between two inconsistent courses of action. The<br />
wronged party has a choice: either to treat the breach as discharging the contract<br />
(ie to “repudiate” or “terminate” the contract), or to affirm the contract. If they<br />
affirm, it seems the right to repudiate will be lost provided that the wronged party<br />
knew of the facts giving rise to the right to repudiate and, it would appear, that<br />
they possessed the right in question. 55 The wronged party must then evince a<br />
decision to relinquish that right by words or conduct. Once the party has made<br />
the choice to affirm the contract, it is bound by that decision. This type of waiver<br />
is sometimes called “waiver by election”.<br />
7.156 The second way is through “waiver by estoppel”. 56 This requires the wronged<br />
party to make an unequivocal representation by words or conduct that it will not<br />
rely on its legal rights. The other party must show that it relied on the<br />
representation by doing something or refraining from doing something, in<br />
circumstances where it would be inequitable for the wronged party to rely on its<br />
legal rights. Normally, the other party would have to show that it has altered its<br />
position to its own detriment. 57<br />
51 See s 34(3).<br />
52<br />
Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd [1992] 1 AC<br />
233.<br />
53 nd<br />
See Baris Soyer, <strong>Warranties</strong> in Marine <strong>Insurance</strong> (2 ed, 2006), ch 6; Clarke para 20-7A;<br />
and MacGillivray, para 10-104.<br />
54 For a full discussion of the authorities on this point see Peyman v Lanjani [1985] I Ch 457.<br />
In Habib Bank Ltd v Tufail [2006] EWCA Civ 374; [2006] All ER (D) 92 (Apr) Lloyd LJ drew<br />
a distinction between affirmation, “where knowledge of the right to rescind is essential” (at<br />
[20]) and “acquiescence”, which requires the other party to show that it relied on the<br />
representation.<br />
55 See Chitty on <strong>Contract</strong>s (29 th ed, 2004), para 24-003.<br />
56 See Chitty on <strong>Contract</strong>s (29 th ed, 2004), paras 24-007 – 24-008.<br />
57 See Tool Metal Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co Ltd [1955] 1 WLR 761; and<br />
Emery v UCB Corporate Services Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 675.<br />
92