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Insurance Contract Law Issues Paper 2 Warranties - Law Commission

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4.12 The “innominate term” classification was welcomed as providing greater flexibility<br />

in the remedies available. 19 However, a recent Court of Appeal judgment, Friends<br />

Provident Life and Pensions v Sirius International <strong>Insurance</strong>, has cast doubt on<br />

the reasoning in the BAI case. 20<br />

4.13 In Friends Provident, the insured had failed to notify the excess layer<br />

underwriters that a potential claim for pensions mis-selling may exceed the<br />

amount insured under the primary layer. This was a breach of Clause 5 of the<br />

policy. Clause 5 was not worded as a condition precedent; nor did it suggest that<br />

a breach would absolve the insurers from liability for the claim. However, the<br />

insurers argued that it was an “innominate term”. The breach should be regarded<br />

as sufficiently serious to absolve the insurers from liability to meet the claim.<br />

4.14 Lord Justice Mance disagreed. He pointed out that breach of an innominate term<br />

would only entitle an insurer to repudiate the contract as a whole; it would not<br />

entitle an insurer to merely reject one specific claim. And it “was not easy to<br />

conceive” that a breach of an ancillary term could be fundamental to the contract<br />

as a whole. The argument that a serious breach of a notice clause would<br />

discharge an insurer from liability to pay that particular claim would introduce a<br />

new doctrine of “partial repudiatory breach”. No such doctrine existed and there<br />

was no reason to introduce it.<br />

4.15 Lord Justice Mance argued that if the insurers had intended Clause 5 to operate<br />

as a condition precedent to liability for a particular claim, they should have<br />

worded it in those terms. As they had not done so, their remedy lay in damages<br />

only. Where insurers failed to draft notification clauses as conditions precedent,<br />

they did not require additional protection:<br />

English law is strict enough as it is in insurers’ favour. I see no reason<br />

to make it stricter. 21<br />

Sir William Aldous agreed, though Lord Justice Waller dissented<br />

4.16 It is true that if insurers do not draft clauses as conditions precedent to liability,<br />

then the decision that their remedy lies in damages only favours policyholders.<br />

The problem, however, is that the Friends Provident decision will encourage<br />

insurers to draft every ancillary provision as a condition precedent. And if the<br />

term is clearly a condition precedent, the courts will be required to interpret it as<br />

such, however minor and unimportant the breach. This could import an untoward<br />

element of technicality and rigidity into the law, whereby claims are denied for<br />

minor breaches by policyholders that cause no real prejudice to insurers.<br />

4.17 Although the case law on notification clauses is not directly applicable to<br />

warranties, these cases illustrate some of the weaknesses of the construction<br />

approach. First, the law is uncertain, and is likely to cause further litigation.<br />

Secondly, each case depends on the particular words used. Insurers are likely to<br />

respond to unfavourable decisions by attempting to achieve the desired effect<br />

with different words.<br />

19 Macgillivray 10-13.<br />

20<br />

[2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 517; [2005] EWCA Civ 601.<br />

21 Above, at para 33.<br />

21

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