From TransFormaTion To CombaT The First stryker brigade at War

four insurgents firing from a nearby rooftop. The Americans returned
fire and called for assistance. While moving against the ambushers, a
reinforcing element from the same battalion encountered resistance
from two other armed men. The troopers returned fire, forcing the pair
to surrender. Meanwhile, the patrol that had encountered the original
ambush killed two of its assailants and took a third prisoner. The small
scale of these incidents was typical of the clashes with insurgents that
U.S. and Iraqi government forces were experiencing around Mosul at
the time.
In addition to its security responsibilities, the brigade also inherited
a mission to train Iraqi security forces. This process normally entailed
pairing newly organized Iraqi formations with U.S. counterparts.
The 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry, for example, adopted the 102d Iraqi
National Guard Battalion, providing it with small-unit and individual
soldier instruction. The U.S. rifle platoons involved alternated patrol
duty with periods in which they trained an Iraqi company. Overall,
the system worked surprisingly well despite the strains it placed on
the American units, which rotated between the two duties virtually
without a break.
The 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry’s fire support officer, Capt. Matthew
P. Lillibridge, was responsible for supervising the unit’s overall training
efforts. At first Lillibridge had little more than his outgoing personality
and well-honed people-handling skills to guide him. Much to his advantage,
however, he also had the assistance of an Iraqi-American soldier,
Pfc. Husam Razaq Almusawi, from battalion headquarters. A linguist
dedicated to his profession, Almusawi served as the captain’s interpreter
and translator of captured enemy documents for the battalion intelligence
officer and in his spare time taught Iraqi National Guardsmen how to
read and write Arabic and English.
Lillibridge and Almusawi primarily acted as intermediaries between
instructors from American rifle platoons and their counterpart Iraqi
companies. They also coordinated the training schedule; arranged for battalion
or brigade logisticians to provide ammunition, vehicles, and other
necessary equipment and supplies; and offered feedback to both the Iraqi
and American chains of command on the progress of the National Guard
units. Just as important, the pair contributed significantly to increasing
trust between local security forces and their U.S. advisers.
The brigade’s focus on training receded on 28 March, when enemy
activity in Mosul took a marked turn upward. On that day gunmen
opened fire on a convoy carrying Iraq’s public works minister, Nisreen
Berwari, killing a security guard and wounding two others. The minister
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