From TransFormaTion To CombaT The First stryker brigade at War

additional combat power for any assault that developed against al-Sadr’s
headquarters. As Major O’Steen would later remark: “Colonel Pittard
figured out that the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry, was more mobile than
2d Battalion, 2d Infantry, and more survivable than 1st Battalion, 14th
Infantry, so we got the mission to go into the center of An Najaf to secure
the mosque where al Sadr was hiding.”
Operation rOad warriOr: Baghdad
Fast-breaking events elsewhere overtook Pittard’s planning. As the
Iraqi interim government and U.S. forces continued their talks with al-
Sadr, other insurgent groups were attempting to starve coalition forces
out of northern Iraq by ambushing logistics convoys moving through
Baghdad. As a result, many of the civilian contract firms that furnished
supply convoy drivers and vehicles were declining to move without
adequate protection. In response, General Sanchez detached TF arrow
from the 3d Brigade Combat Team, put it under the operational
control of the 13th Corps Support Command, and gave it the mission to
escort supply trucks traversing the 160-mile distance between scanIa
and anaconda. At that time, the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, received
instructions to remain behind with Pittard’s 3d Brigade Combat Team
to continue the watch on al-Sadr.
As the Strykers retraced their route from FOB duke to CSC scanIa
on the morning of 17 April 2004, Major O’Steen realized how serious
the situation had become. There were “miles of halted convoys” south
of Baghdad, he said, all under instructions to hold in place.
Arriving at scanIa and reporting to the 13th Corps Support Command,
Colonel Reed learned that TF arrow would begin escorting
convoys at 0700 the following day. He had little problem with the
hour, but he balked when he learned that the logistics staff planned to
scatter individual Strykers throughout a convoy. He explained that the
approach would reduce the vehicles’ effectiveness by failing to make
proper use of their mobility and firepower. As a compromise, he suggested
that the command assign a Stryker company to each convoy,
give the unit’s commander free rein to configure his force as he saw
fit, and reduce each grouping of logistics vehicles to a size a Stryker
company could adequately protect. In addition, a convoy could no
longer be treated as a simple element in a line of supply. Each had to
be viewed as a distinct combat operation with readily available helicopter,
air, and artillery support. The Support Command agreed but
specified that the first several convoys heading north would be larger
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