COUNTERSTROKE AT SOLTSY - Strategy & Tactics Press

The German plan called for 3rd Motorized Division
to cover the corps’ northern flank, but that unit was
experiencing its own difficulties. The road system was
composed largely of narrow dirt paths cutting through
swamps with few bridges. A detachment under 1st Lt.
Feldkeller managed to push its way forward, but ran
into an aggressive Soviet defense. The time was ripe
for a counterattack.
Counterstroke
Soviet reconnaissance had established that the road
along the Shelon River was choked with columns of
German tanks and other vehicles. In the Soviet view
the arrogance of the “Hitlerites” was such that they
neglected the security of their flanks and rear. Eleventh
Army staff quickly came to the conclusion the
situation was favorable for launching a counterblow,
where a gap of 100 kilometers had formed between
the 41st and 56th Motorized Corps. The catalyst, how-
ever, was a message sent on 10 July from G.K. Zhukov
of the Supreme High Command in Moscow. Zhukov
severely criticized 11 th Army for failure to launch a
major counterattack and hinted of the consequences of
continued inaction.
With that inducement, the Soviet Northwestern
Front commander, Gen. Maj. P.P. Sobennikov, decided
to exploit the developing gap between the enemy
corps. [The Northwestern Front was a subordinate
formation of the Northwestern Direction. ed.] He had
two primary objectives: disrupting the German offensive
toward Novgorod and smashing the 56 Motorized
Corps. Voroshilov formalized the arrangement by
directing 11 th Army to make strikes from converging
directions to encircle and destroy the enemy. Units of
11 th Army regrouped into northern and southern operational
groups.
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