COUNTERSTROKE AT SOLTSY - Strategy & Tactics Press

the uganda Connection
In the late 1950s the new state of Israel needed to strengthen its diplomatic and economic ties with the outside world. Uganda, a nation
on the frontier of a hostile Arab and Muslim world, was a country whose friendship the Israelis thought worth cultivating. In April
1963, Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir signed a treaty of cooperation with newly independent Uganda. But the friendship would end
when Idi Amin seized control of the government in January 1971. Ironically, an Israeli firm had built Entebbe Airport during friendlier
times.
Amin had been chief of the Ugandan armed forces, and had initially come to power promising to restore the constitutional government
former President Milton Obote had usurped. Amin made himself dictator, however, and proceeded to establish a reputation for
torture and massacre. He gained some notoriety in the West for statements praising Hitler. Still, many Africans saw him as a shrewd
leader clearing the last vestiges of European colonialism from the continent.
In the summer of 1971 the Israelis inadvertently offended Amin. Four African heads of state flew to Israel as emissaries of the Organization
of African Unity to attempt to mediate peace in the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict. Amin decided he wanted to attend, but the
Israeli government, aware he was not popular with the other African delegates, hinted a visit at that time might not be prudent. Amin’s
attempt to muscle into the African delegation was a failure. He blamed the Israelis.
Soon afterward, Amin requested a squadron of Israeli Phantom fighter jets attack neighboring Tanzania and Kenya so he could seize
tracts of land from those countries. When Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dyan refused to provide the aircraft, Amin threw in his lot
with oil-rich Libya and began virulent verbal attacks on Israel.
In March 1972, Amin began admitting student pilots from terrorist organizations into the Ugandan Air Force Academy. He also
began to compare himself to Hitler. That same month he gave Uganda’s sizable Israeli colony a few hours to get out of the country.
(Amin had perhaps another reason for his erratic policies. He had briefly visited Israel in order to be treated for syphilis, but proved a
most uncooperative patient.)
Gideon Gera, former senior officer in the Israeli military and an expert on Middle East affairs, speculated on why the terrorists had
struck in June 1976: “It seems the Palestinian question is no longer enjoying enthusiastic and growing support as it did a year ago when
it peaked with Arafat’s appearance at the U.N. The war in Lebanon, the terrible slaughter, has damaged the Palestinian organization’s
prestige, and detracted from their popularity even in the Arab world. The terror groups that thought up this hijacking wanted to prove
one thing—the war against Israel continues!”
A major policy of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was
that in negotiations with terrorists the main objective was to free
hostages rather than give in to demands to release prisoners from
Israeli jails. When a hijacking took place in a country friendly to
Israel, Rabin’s policy was that the responsibility for saving the
hostages lay with the host country. Uganda, however, was no longer
friendly to Israel, and the French (who owned the hijacked
airliner) showed little inclination to take the lead in resolving the
situation. When the Entebbe crisis broke, Rabin realized the Israelis
would have to take on the terrorists by themselves.
As for Idi Amin, he would later be overthrown following a
disastrous war with Tanzania. He fled to Saudi Arabia where he
died in 2003.
the other an airborne hospital. They were all escorted
by Israeli Air Force F4 Phantom fighters, the Phantoms
then having to turn back owing to fuel limitations.
The operation’s precise planning left no margin
for tardiness, but the weather was not severe enough to
significantly interfere. As the aircraft approached Entebbe,
the men within them strapped on equipment and
ammunition, checked their weapons, and prayed. Just
before 11:00 p.m., 3 July, a bell in the lead transport
signaled imminent landing.
on the Ground
A teen-aged soldier named Tzur Ben-Ami had been
chosen to drive the Mercedes and, as he cranked its
freshly tuned engine, Netaniahu and seven other commandoes
squeezed into the compact. More soldiers
climbed into two jeeps lashed into place behind the
Mercedes.
Ground view: hostages in front of the Entebbe terminal.
Fortunately, a passenger plane was scheduled to arrive at Entebbe
Airport at about the same time, and one runway’s landing
lights were burning, guiding in the Israelis. At 11:03, 30 seconds
behind schedule, the first Hercules touched down. Before the
plane came to a full stop, the Mercedes, closely followed by the
jeeps, was out and headed to the terminal.
More soldiers charged from the lead plane and headed for the
control tower to ensure there would be no interference from there
when the time came to leave. At that moment, the Mercedes was
approaching the terminal where the hostages were imprisoned.
The car was of a type the Israelis were not expecting to be challenged.
High-ranking Ugandan Army officers were issued black
Mercedes for their personal use, and the rescuers hoped the sen-
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