COUNTERSTROKE AT SOLTSY - Strategy & Tactics Press

The Germans
German panzer groups were independent
mobile units. Unlike the numbered
armies, the panzer groups were not
supposed to be used to hold sectors of the
front, but instead were employed as operational
forces to gain the decision. In
the 1941 campaign, they were frequently
switched across the Eastern Front to exploit
opportunities. As a result, the Germans
made some incredible advances, but
at the cost of wear and tear on the vehicles
and men. Among other things, German tank replacement was minimal
in 1941, as Hitler wanted to use new production to build up
reserves rather than committing tanks piecemeal at the front.
The panzer groups were initially composed of motorized corps
(later redesignated panzer corps), each with several panzer (armored)
and motorized divisions. As the war progressed, the panzer
groups were redesignated panzer armies and ended up holding sectors
of the front. They also received considerable infusions of nonmotorized
formations, with a corresponding decline in mobility. A
major German dilemma, which was never resolved during the war,
was their lack of strategic reserves. Crises had to be met by switching
divisions across the theater of operations or pulling units from
other fronts.
The Luftwaffe in 1941 was still at the highpoint of its effectiveness.
Its operational air doctrine and high state of training allowed
it to concentrate anywhere on the front. The Luftwaffe was
an integral part of the blitzkrieg, striking deep into the enemy rear
and covering deep-ranging panzer columns. But its strength was
frequently dissipated when used as a “fire brigade,” bailing out
ground forces with close support and air supply.
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