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8 #232 army group’s southeastern flank. Eighteenth Army’s mission was to conquer Estonia and capture the Soviet naval bases at Tallinn and Paldiski. Units of 4 th Panzer Group were to move directly north to occupy the Narva crossings near Kingisepp, thereby preventing a withdrawal of enemy units from Estonia. The weakness to the plan was that until 16 th Army could move up, 4 th Panzer Group would have to defend alone against enemy counterattacks from east of Lake Ilmen. On 8 July OKH issued a directive significantly changing the plan of Army Group North. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Franz Halder was concerned about Army Group Center’s battle of encirclement in the Smolensk area. There were insufficient mobile forces to complete the envelopment, so 3 rd Panzer Group would not move north after all. More, Hitler wanted 4 th Panzer Group to cut off Leningrad to the east and southeast. Halder, who at the time assumed Army Group North enjoyed a clear numerical superiority, readily agreed to the plan. That shifted the main effort of the offensive to the Novgorod-Volkhov-Shlisselburg line and was also intended as support for the Finnish attack from the north. The Army General Staff also ordered infantry divisions to move toward Leningrad to make the mobile units available for other tasks as soon as possible. In sum, OKH stopped the preparations for a direct assault on Leningrad and demanded the shift of the main effort to the army group’s right. Leningrad would not be taken by direct assault. Instead, it would be by-passed from the southeast, encircled, and placed under siege. Army Group North accepted the order without much comment. That can only be explained by von Mastermind at work: FM von Leeb plans the attack. Leeb’s belief the Soviets would continue to withdraw if attacked, as had been the case up until then. More, the army group staff believed Soviet forces southeast of Leningrad were the last units in the area capable of offering serious resistance. And von Leeb welcomed the opportunity to rest his hard-driving formations and bring up fresh troops. He even doubted the Soviets were determined to hold the approaches to Leningrad. The View from Moscow Stalin and the Red Army Staff (STAVKA) divided the Eastern Front from the Baltic to the Black Sea into three “Glavkom,” or Directions, a Soviet military term with no western equivalent. Each Direction—Northwestern, Western and Southwestern—was roughly the equivalent of a German Army Group. Marshal K.Y. Voroshilov was in command of the Northwestern Direction. Stalin needed people he could trust to command each Glavkom, and Voroshilov was exactly that kind of man. He was a crony of Stalin’s from the days of the Russian Civil War and for some time he had been the People’s Commissar (Minister) of Defense. When Voroshilov arrived in Leningrad on 10 July, he had, on paper, at least 30 divisions available for the defense of the Northwestern Front; however, only five of them were at full strength, the rest averaging only about a third of their authorized men and equipment. Accordingly, the Soviet defense was to rely on fortifications. The Luga Line was the first of several fortified systems defending the approaches to Leningrad. About 30,000 civilians worked around the clock to build it. At the moment when Army Group North encountered the outer defenses of the Luga Line, the Luga Operational Group, with regular Red Army divisions backed by militia, had some 300 kilometers to hold. Reinforcements were committed out of the reserves held in Leningrad. Directly in the path of 4th Panzer Group’s advance was Gen. Lt. V.I. Morozov’s 11th Army. It had been in action since the beginning of the invasion, and its one tank and six rifle divisions were understrength. Soviet rifle divisions were normally expected to hold combat frontages of six to eight kilometers, but the rifle divisions on the front line were required to hold three times that. On 10 July, Army Group North outnumbered the Northwestern Front by 2.4 to 1 in infantry, 4 to 1 in guns, 5.8 to 1 in mortars, 1.2 to 1 in tanks, and 10 to 1 in aircraft. When the Germans attacked, the Soviets retreated immediately. That was mainly due to the fact they were overextended and heavily outgunned, but also because they were out of range of army command. It seemed disaster had struck once again for the Red Army. Morozov was left with only blocking forces to stop the German drive to Leningrad and Novgorod.
Opening Moves Fourth Panzer Group began its advance on 10 July with two motorized corps using divergent roads. Manstein’s 56 th Motorized Corps (8 th Panzer and 3 rd Motorized Divisions) advanced on the right in the direction of Porkhov-Soltsy-Shimsk-Novgorod. On the left was Reinhardt’s 41st Motorized Corps with three mobile divisions (1 st Panzer, 6 th Panzer, 36 th Motorized) and one infantry division (269 th ). Reinhardt was moving up the Pskov-Luga-Leningrad axis. Fourth Panzer Group was determined to get to the starting positions for the Leningrad encirclement within four days. That represented an advance of about 300 kilometers (190 miles), a preposterous distance for the time allowed. The Germans could succeed only if they encountered neither resistance nor difficult terrain. A further dilemma arose when Fourth Panzer Group found itself unable to protect its 200 kilometer long eastern flank and, as events would prove, not even its own rear. On the other hand, all five of the mobile divisions leading the advance were in excellent condition, perhaps the peak of their effectiveness for the war. The one exception was the SS Totenkopf Motorized Infantry Division. It had taken considerable casualties in heavy fighting on the Stalin Line fortifications at Sebezh. As a result, Totenkopf had to disband one of its three motorized infantry regiments and was not in position to advance with the rest of 56 th Motorized Corps. On 12 July, Army Group North ordered the SS division moved to Porchov for re-organization. Nonetheless, 56 th Motorized Corps advanced swiftly. On 11 July Porchov was taken by Gen. Maj. Curt Jahn’s 3rd Motorized Division. Following behind was Correlation of Forces, Morning, 15 July 1941 Soviets Ratio Germans Personnel 50,500 1.6 – 1.0 30,700 Tanks and assault guns 105 .5 – 1.0 192 Artillery pieces 199 1.5 – 1.0 132 Comparison of Soviet 70 th Rifle Division to German 8 th Panzer Div. at Soltsy Soviet 70 th Rifle Div 8 th Panzer. Div. Soviet Account likely # of Germans All Soviets at Soltsy, 15 July Soviet: German Ratio Personnel 15,333 16,120 14,900 30,000 2.0 – 1.0 Tanks 16 201 186 56 .3 – 1.0 Artillery 53 60 48 95 2.0 – 1.0 Note 1: Estimated total then engaged Note 2: Germans likely had still fewer tanks due to mechanical breakdowns. Gen. Maj. Eric Brandenburger’s 8 th Panzer Division, which moved quickly toward Sitnya, some 20 kilometers west of Soltsy. But 56 th Motorized Corps achieved little breadth in its penetration. Each of these two divisions advanced with only one assault group to the front. Facing them were small blocking forces of Soviet armor and infantry from Gen. Maj. M.L. Chernyavsky’s 1 Mechanized Corps. To the Soviet rear, the remains of Col. V.K. Gorbachev’s 202 Motorized Rifle Division, reinforced with NKVD Destroyer Detachments, organized the city of Sol’tsy for defense, mobilizing armed detachments of civilians. With considerable resistance developing along the Luga road, on 12 July Hoepner switched the three mobile divisions of Reinhardt’s corps to the northwest. He hoped for a breakthrough to Leningrad over the Ivanovskoye and the Koporye plateaus, where the terrain was open. That left only infantry on the road in front of Luga. Hoepner’s decision was clearly incompatible with the OKH orders of 8 July. Nonetheless, the episode provides a good example of the comparative independence panzer commanders had at that time in the war. Manstein later writes that the change of direction was: “…a particularly risky move when one considered that even though the enemy forces engaged by the corps to date had been outfought, they were far from annihilated…Be that as it may, we were still convinced that the corps would continue to find its safety in speed of movement.” strategy & tactics 9
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