COUNTERSTROKE AT SOLTSY - Strategy & Tactics Press

on the 26 th that replacements were indeed available—but
they were far back on the road to Germany. Much more
troublesome were the equipment losses in 8 th Panzer Division.
They were high and difficult to replace. Germany
was too short on mobile divisions to have a panzer division
knocked out of action for a month.
Then came the delegation of blame. In his postwar
memoirs, Manstein was critical of Hoepner’s decision to
withdraw the SS Totenkopf Division from the right flank of
his corps after its earlier battles to the south. Manstein had
indeed requested on 14 July a return of SS Totenkopf and
that was refused by Hoepner. It is likely the army group
commander felt he needed at least some reserve for the
attack on Leningrad. Manstein later urged the insertion of
his corps behind that of Reinhardt’s on the lower Luga, but
that was forbidden by Hitler. The Führer even followed up
with a visit to von Leeb’s Headquarters on 21 July, where
he demanded Leningrad be “finished off speedily.”
With the defeat of 56 th Motorized Corps and stalemate
elsewhere along the Luga Line, German forces paused to
gather strength for their next general offensive. Hitler directed
that any farther advance toward Leningrad would
have to wait until the infantry of 16 th Army had secured
the eastern flank of the army group. Later he authorized
units of 3 rd Panzer Group and the whole of 8 th Air Corps to
move north from Army Group Center to assist Leeb in his
renewed offensive, scheduled to begin 8 August. Notably,
plans still included the encirclement of Leningrad from the
southeast, and in the end, that was accomplished if only
by a narrow margin. But Leningrad was never taken.
The objective: Leningrad, with Soviet militia mobilizing.
References
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