COUNTERSTROKE AT SOLTSY - Strategy & Tactics Press

The Rise of Russia
Modern Russia really began with the rise of the
Muscovite state that, until the end of the European
middle ages, was little more than a vassal of the Mongol
Khanate of the Golden Horde. But a powerful vassal
it was and, by the early 16 th century, Moscovy had
largely destroyed the remnants of Mongolian power
west of the Urals. The Russians then continued to expand,
absorbing the ancient states of Novgorod and
Kiev, as well as sweeping deep into Siberia and Central
Asia.
Of course, when dealing with assorted Mongols
and Asian peoples, the Russians had little concern
for balance of power issues. Consequently, conquest
tended to be complete, including extensive colonization
of subjected peoples. In a sense, it was a clash of
civilizations. The Russians were better organized, and
they also had a military advantage. Traditionally, the
peoples of the Asian steppes relied on horse-mobile
armies that were capable of outmaneuvering enemies
both strategically and tactically. But the rise of modern,
disciplined Western armies equipped with gunpowder
weapons returned the tactical ascendancy to the Europeans.
They could easily smash a nomadic army on the
battlefield. Strategically, the Russians used a combination
of forts, military colonies and secured trade routes
to limit the mobility of steppe armies as well as extend
their own rule. Then there were the personality issues:
the rise of Russia took place in the era of such great
leaders as Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, while
the steppe peoples failed to produce another Genghis
Khan or Tamerlane.
The constant eastern warfare gave the Russian military
something of an edge when it came to the practical
aspects of war. Commanders had to be good, or they
would be annihilated. In the 18 th century, the Russian
military proved adept at organizing mobile, combined
arms columns to track down nomad foes. And Russian
commanders such as Alexander Suvarov also became
good at fighting and winning decisive campaigns.
All that underscores the Russian divergence from
contemporary European warfare. The Russians had
a frontier into which to expand. The other European
powers did not, at least not on the continent—hence
their competition for colonies in the Americas and India.
At home, the Europeans were forced into a limited
form of warfare in which diplomacy and mutual preservation
were overriding considerations. The Russians
had more room to maneuver.
Enter Catherine the Great
Catherine, later known as the “Great” (see the sidebar
on biographies), came to power at a unique time in
European history. The year 1762 saw the beginning of
the end of the Seven Years War, which pitted the great
powers against each other both on the continent and
around the world. Britain and Prussia emerged from
the war as the leading powers of Europe, while France
and Austria had their stars eclipsed by battlefield defeat
and financial exhaustion. It was especially bad for
France, which lost its colonies in the New World. [For
more on the Seven Years War, see S&T nr. 231. ed.]
Russia was in a position to assume the mantle of the
primary continental power. And that Catherine did, by
the usual method: war. During her reign (1762-96),
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