COUNTERSTROKE AT SOLTSY - Strategy & Tactics Press

of 53 terrorists to be released from Israeli, American,
French and West German prisons in return for the hostages.
Hadad had chosen Entebbe partly because he believed
it beyond the reach of Israel’s military and any
possible rescue. Also attractive were Ugandan dictator
Idi Amin’s anti-Semitic views. Among other things,
Amin had stated that Adolf Hitler had not murdered
enough Jews during the Holocaust. Hadad figured the
Ugandan dictator would provide troops to protect the
operation once on the ground. And sure enough, the
hijackers were greeted warmly at Entebbe Airport by
Amin himself, who placed his army at the hijackers’
service.
The hostages were herded into the Old Terminal
building (as the structure was called) to await developments
as the Israeli government negotiated with
the PFLP. When Amin first visited the hostages he announced:
“I support the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine, and I think that Israel and Zionism is
wrong. I know that you are innocent, but the guilty one
is your government. I haven’t slept since you arrived. I
haven’t yet received the demands of the Popular Front,
but I promise you that I will do everything to protect
your lives.”
jerusalem
In Jerusalem, Tuesday evening, 29 June, a cable
arrived at the foreign ministry. It was from the Israeli
embassy in Paris. Haim Baron, the prime minister’s
personal assistant, immediately took the communiqué
to Foreign Minister Yigal Allon. The message relayed
detailed instructions from Entebbe:
• All 53 terrorist prisoners to be released and brought
to Entebbe Airport.
• A plane for the hijackers to be brought to Entebbe.
• Air France must arrange the flight to Entebbe of
the terrorists imprisoned in Israel. The aircraft will
carry the prisoners released by Israel, the aircrew,
and no one else.
• The other countries requested to release prisoners
must make their own arrangements to transport
them to Entebbe.
• The ambassador for Somalia in Kampala, Uganda,
Hashi Abdulla, will represent the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine in negotiations with the
government of France, and the hijackers will recognize
no one else as representing their interests.
• France will appoint a representative who will handle
negotiations with the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine.
A 1:00 p.m., Thursday, 1 July, Israel time, was given
as the deadline for these demands being met. Though
Hadad meant business, so did the Israelis. As soon as Israeli
Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin and his cabinet were
clear on the situation, they ordered the military to commence
plans for a rescue mission.
Back in Entebbe the PFLP members separated the
49 non-Jewish prisoners from the Jewish ones, jamming
192 of the latter into a room 40 by 80 feet. This
segregation of prisoners reminded Yitzak David of
how SS Dr. Josef Mengele had separated him from
the rest of his family upon their arrival at Auschwitz
concentration camp in Poland. He had been healthy
enough to be selected as a slave laborer, and therefore
survived the war. His loved ones were sent straight to
the gas chambers.
On the evening of the 29 th , Israeli Army Gen. Mota
Gur, chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF),
addressed a group of high-ranking officers: “Gentlemen,
I was asked this afternoon by the prime minister
if the IDF can rescue the hijacked hostages from Entebbe
Airport. Gentlemen, what have you got to say?”
There was no shortage of suggestions.
The following day Maj. Gen. Yitzak Hofi, head of
Israel’s secret service organization, Mossad issued orders
to his operatives to gather every scrap of information
on what was transpiring at Entebbe Airport.
Rabin’s advisor on counter-terrorism and espionage,
Maj. Gen. Rehavam Zeevi, went to work assembling
a staff of Mossad’s senior intelligence agents. When
he had summoned all his operatives, he outlined mission
directives: get data and distribute it to competent
authorities, produce situation scenarios for the prime
minister and the ministerial team, keep the heads of
secret services in the diplomatic and operational picture,
and evaluate the possibilities of diplomatic and
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