Številka 54 - Odvetniška Zbornica Slovenije

Odvetnik 54 / december 2011 Avtorski sinopsis
67
dr. Ernest Petrič
Pogled ustavnega sodnika na
odvetništvo
Ena od značilnosti sodobnega sveta, zlasti v drugi polovici 20. stoletja,
je uveljavljanje človekovih pravic v vseh vidikih življenja. Odvetniki
so pomemben dejavnik pri varstvu človekovih pravic. To naj bi
bili v vseh postopkih pred sodišči na vseh ravneh – z njihovo ustrezno,
tudi ustavnopravno argumentacijo.
Tudi pri varstvu pravne države je neodvisno, samostojno odvetništvo
pomemben partner Ustavnemu sodišču.
Z močjo kreativne odvetniške ustavnopravne argumentacije odvetniki
prispevajo k nastajanju, uveljavljanju in učinkovanju ustavnopravnih
precedensov.
Omejitev pristopa k Ustavnemu sodišču z odvetnikom, morda celo
s posebej licenciranim, bi v danih razmerah prispevala k učinkovitejšemu
delu Ustavnega sodišča, četudi bi do neke mere nihilirala
pristop do Ustavnega sodišča.
V kritikah dela Ustavnega sodišča s strani odvetnikov – in seveda
tudi obratno – se velja vzdržati neargumentiranih pavšalnih ocen,
saj te škodujejo avtoriteti in ugledu celotnega pravosodja.
dr. Ernest Petrič
The view of a Constitutional Court
Judge on the attorneyship
The contemporary world, particularly in the second half of the 20 th
century, is characterised, inter alia, by the expansion of human rights
in all aspects of life. Lawyers are an important factor in the protection
of human rights. Such should apply to all proceedings before
the courts of any level – provided that appropriate arguments, including
constitutional law ones, are used.
Attorney ship is an important independent partner to the Constitutional
Court in the protection of the principle of the state governed
by the rule of law as well.
By their creative power of constitutional arguments, lawyers contribute
to the formation, implementation, and exercise of constitutional
precedents.
In the given circumstances, limiting the access to the Constitutional
Court by the obligatory representation by a lawyer, possibly by a licensed
one, would contribute to a greater efficiency of the Constitutional
Court, even if such would annihilate the access to the Constitutional
Court to some extent.
When criticising the work of the Constitutional Court, attorneys
should refrain from using unsubstantiated overgeneralised arguments
– and vice versa –, since such are damaging for the authority
and reputation of the entire judiciary.
dr. Marko Novak
Dobesedna razlaga v pravu kot trdno
izhodišče
V primerjavi s predhodnimi družbami je formalnost prava, ki jo je
uveljavilo moderno pravo, vrednota, ki nam jo je prineslo predvsem
razsvetljenstvo. Zaradi pretirane formalnosti prava ali formalizma
je postmoderna pravna teorija takšen pristop kritizirala, tudi na področju
pravne razlage. Četudi je bila takšna kritika pogosto upravičena,
je treba danes paziti, da ne gremo iz ene skrajnosti v drugo in
vsega, tudi razumevanja pomena pravnih besedil ne zrelativiziramo.
Izhodišče vsakršne, tudi ustavne razlage, mora biti dobesedni pomen
pravnega sporočila, če je ta seveda mogoč. To je »železno« izhodišče,
od katerega ne smemo kar tako odstopiti, odstop v smeri
korekcij dobesedne razlage pa mora biti posebej utemeljen. Šele tedaj
se prebijemo v drugi, instrumentalizmu bolj naklonjen razlagalni
koncentrični krog, kjer argumentiramo tudi s pomočjo neobveznih
razlagalnih argumentov. Toda do tja je treba šele priti, kajti tudi
v ustavi so jasne določbe, trdni pomeni in lahki primeri, ki jih razlagamo
bolj formalistično.
dr. Marko Novak
Verbatim interpretation as a firm
ground
The formality of law that we know today, which had mostly been
developed in modern law, is a value that was brought to such law
in the era of Enlightenment. However, due to its progress towards
becoming too excessive formality or formalism, post-modern legal
theory has criticized such an approach to law, also in the area of legal
interpretation. Although such criticism was mostly justified it is
necessary not to go from one extreme to another and subject everything,
also the understanding of legal text, to relativity.
The starting-point of every interpretation, even constitutional, should
be the literal meaning of a legal text, if such is of course possible.
This is a strict rule from which we should not depart so easily, but
if for any reason we should, such departure to correcting literal interpretation
should be justified properly. Only then we cross the second
line that is more inclined to instrumentalism or functionalism,
where we argue by means of non-mandatory interpretative arguments.
But to reach that point is not that easy since even in the constitution
we have clear provisions, firm meanings, and easy cases, in
the event of which interpretation should be formalistic.
doc. dr. Konrad Plauštajner
Spornost avtentične razlage zakonske
določbe
Skoraj dvajset let po sprejetju Zakona o gospodarskih javnih službah
je Državni zbor RS sprejel avtentično razlago njegovega 40. člena.
Ta govori o načinu reševanja sporov iz koncesijskih razmerij.
Taki spori se lahko rešujejo le pred rednimi sodišči, in ne pred arbitražo,
ki naj ne bi dovolj ščitila javnega interesa.
Po avtorjevem mnenju je taka odločitev pravno zgrešena. Opozarja,
da poznejša zakona, tj. Zakon o arbitraži in Zakon o javno-zasebnem
partnerstvu, v premoženjskih sporih arbitražo dopuščata in s
tem po načelu lex posterior derogat prior izključujeta uporabo 40.
člena ZGJS.
doc. dr. Konrad Plauštajner
Controversial Authentic Interpretation
of a Law Provision
After nearly twenty years, the National Assembly of Republic of
Slovenia has issued an authentic interpretation of Article 40 of the
Public Trading Act. All disputes arising within concession relationships
are to be solved by regular courts and not by the arbitration,
which supposedly does not protect enough the public interest.
The author estimates such interpretation to be legally erroneous. At
the same time he points out that subsequent laws, i.e. the Law on
Arbitration and the Law on Public-Private Partnership allow the arbitration
in pecuniary disputes and thereby eliminate the application
of Article 40 of the Public Trading Act according to the principle
of lex posterior derogat prior.