číslo 1/2013 - Paneurópska vysoká škola

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Global Media Journal
road shows’. 23 The larger political parties no longer sought to lead public opinion, but rather to follow it. This
change had two, seemingly contradictory, outcomes, whose results, however, were identical. On the one hand,
they targeted different social groups through different channels with different messages; on the other, their
communication through the mainstream media focused on their most loyal voters and mirrored their choice
of values – in other words, they no longer claimed to be representing ‘the truth’ as such on an exclusive basis,
but acknowledged ideological pluralism.
3. Since 2010, however, the second Orbán government has broken this rule, and attempted to monopolise
the truth. A first hint of this came with the so-called ‘Declaration of National Co-operation’: adopted
by the parliamentary majority, this declaration must be posted up in all public administrative units and defines
such joint national goals as ‘work, home, family, health and order’. 24 Subsequent indicators include the preamble
to the new constitution, with references to God, Christianity, the Holy Crown, as well as ‘faith, hope
and love’; 25 the introduction into the new Media Act of the coalition’s moral values (including the defence of
children, public morals, public order, the churches, and strict limitations on pornography); and the renaming
of some streets and squares. The second Orbán government has abandoned the practice of its predecessors
and has begun to seek ideological hegemony.
Explaining these paradigm shifts
What explains these paradigm shifts in media politics The first shift – from conflict to compromise,
from one-party to multi-party media control, and from political propaganda to political marketing – may be
explained by the political elites’ recognition that the capture of the public service broadcasters did not necessarily
amount to the manipulation of public opinion and voting behaviour. In fact, quite the opposite: the
colonisation of the public broadcasters could come at a high political price, as the fall of the Antall–Boros government
demonstrated in 1994 (Tóka and Popescu, 2002). This assumption was confirmed during a series
of personal interviews conducted with senior politicians in Budapest in April and May 2011, even though they
stressed without exception that the media continue to be important in reaching voters. 26 Politicians would also
seem to have realised that there is life outside the media, as was shown by the rise and growing popularity of
such minor parties as the Hungarian Life and Justice Party before the 1998 elections and the Centrum Party
23 Based on personal interviews with Ildikó Lendvai, former fraction leader of the Hungarian Socialist Party (Budapest,
May 5, 2011), Gábor Kuncze, former fraction leader of the Free Democrats Alliance (Budapest, May 12, 2011), and
a former chief communicator of Fidesz who requested anonymity (May 30, 2011).
24 A political declaration subtitled May There Be Peace, Freedom and Accord and adopted by the new government on
June 14, 2010. The full text of the declaration is available at (last accessed October 5, 2012).
25 Hungary36 s new base law was adopted on April 18, 2011, with the opposition parties either abstaining or voting
against.
26 Based on personal interviews with András Schiffer, fraction leader of the Politics Can Be Different party (Budapest,
May 4, 2011), Ildikó Lendvai, former fraction leader of the Hungarian Socialist Party (Budapest, May 5, 2011), Gábor
Kuncze, former fraction leader of the Free Democrats Alliance (Budapest, May 12, 2011), and a former chief communicator
of Fidesz who requested anonymity (May 30, 2011).
GMJ Book.indb 36 21.1.2013 9:44