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the term. These include: the petroleum and gas sectors; 27 ports; the metal and mining
sectors; transport generally; airline pilots; production, transport and distribution of fuel;
railway services; and metropolitan transport. 28
107. These principles are illustrated in the complaint against the Government of Bahrain
presented by the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions concerning Law No. 49 of
2006 amending certain provisions of the Trade Union Law. As amended, this law
prohibited strikes in essential services which may disturb national security or disrupt the
daily life of citizens. On 20 November 2006, the Prime Minister issued Decision No. 62 of
2006, which listed the essential services, including oil and gas installations, where strike
action was prohibited. The CFA stated that the definition set out in Section 21(d) of the
Trade Union Law was broader than the definition of essential services in the strict sense of
the term. 29 The CFA also stated that what is meant by essential services in the strict sense
of the term depends to a large extent on the particular circumstances prevailing in a
country. Moreover, this concept is not absolute, in the sense that a non-essential service
may become essential if a strike lasts beyond a certain time or extends beyond a certain
scope, thus endangering the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the
population. 30
108. Serious economic, financial and taxation losses may not constitute a defence that enables
the government to prohibit strikes in the oil and gas industry as an essential sector. In the
case of Norway, presented by the Norwegian Trade Union Federation of Oil Workers
(OFS), the Government listed the consequences of the strike and provided an evaluation of
the situation as a reason for making a strike illegal. The three-day strike by about
3,900 OFS members in mid-1990 led to the closure of all fields on the Norwegian
continental shelf and the cessation of all Norwegian oil and gas production. The
Government argued that, firstly, there were economic consequences since the oil sector
played a crucial role for Norwegian society and it was the State rather than the oil
companies that had to bear most of the loss of income. The OFS strike was estimated to
incur a loss in gross production value of about 1,500 million Norwegian kroner per week,
with the State suffering a loss of about 800 million kroner per week in taxes and royalties,
and about 300 million kroner from its direct involvement in the petroleum industry.
Secondly, the export income from the oil industry was nearly one-third of Norway’s total
export income, and the State’s gross income from the petroleum sector amounted to about
one-half of its expenditure on the purchase of goods and services. Since the high level of
Norwegian social benefits had largely been made possible by oil revenues, a long-lasting
conflict of this magnitude might undermine the basis of the welfare state. The Government
also referred to the difficult employment situation as an additional factor. In setting aside
the Government’s arguments, the CFA concluded that such socio-economic consequences
for the population could not alone prevail over a clear and imminent threat to the life,
personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population. 31
27 ILO: Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association, No. 320, Case No. 1865, para. 513;
and Report No. 211, Case No. 965, para. 199.
28 2006 Digest, para. 587.
29 ILO: Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association, No. 349, Case No. 2552.
30 2006 Digest, para. 582.
31
ILO: Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association, No. 279, Case No. 1576, paras 102,
103 and 114.
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