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Strauss on Xenophon's Socrates Xenophon's Socratic Discourse: An ...

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108 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER<br />

increase his possessi<strong>on</strong>s" (102-103). <strong>Socrates</strong> must then, if he<br />

possesses no income-producing possessi<strong>on</strong>s, "be a parasite, a beggar-in<br />

a word, an unjust man" (104).<br />

But "<strong>Socrates</strong> was in truth of course not unjust but thoroughly<br />

just . . ." (104; cf. 102). The view that <strong>Socrates</strong> was a beggar or<br />

parasite and hence unjust is (at least potentially) the view of the<br />

gentleman like Ischomachos, an ultimately untrue view (104-105).<br />

<strong>Socrates</strong> had to c<strong>on</strong>ceal the truth about his way of life (cf. 110) no<br />

doubt because of how that truth would be interpreted by the<br />

gentlemen "in the comm<strong>on</strong> meaning of the term," the moral and<br />

civic-minded men. This introducti<strong>on</strong> to the treatment of the c<strong>on</strong>trast<br />

or c<strong>on</strong>flict between <strong>Socrates</strong> and the gentleman (whether the<br />

actual gentleman Ischomachos, here named for the first time, or the<br />

would-be gentleman Kritoboulos) is probably the most important<br />

task which <str<strong>on</strong>g>Strauss</str<strong>on</strong>g> set for this chapter. It would be difficult to imagine<br />

a more fundamental issue than this, c<strong>on</strong>cerning as it does the<br />

point of view from which all of life, including ec<strong>on</strong>omics, is to be<br />

understood. For just as <strong>Socrates</strong> appears in a certin light when<br />

looked at from the point of view of a gentleman, so can the<br />

gentleman be looked at from <strong>Socrates</strong>' point of view. From that<br />

point of view, the gentleman's need for increase of wealth (cf.<br />

Oec<strong>on</strong>omicus XI.8 and VII.15)"bespeaks a defect" (101-102). Even<br />

more important, from <strong>Socrates</strong> ' point of view, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Strauss</str<strong>on</strong>g> implies, the<br />

gentleman's freedom from what <str<strong>on</strong>g>Strauss</str<strong>on</strong>g> calls "prejudices" comes to<br />

light as less than complete. 5 It appears that <strong>Socrates</strong>' justice-referred<br />

to by <str<strong>on</strong>g>Strauss</str<strong>on</strong>g> for the first time in the commentary proper <strong>on</strong><br />

102-went together with freedom from "prejudices," while the<br />

justice of the gentleman did not. This makes us all the more eager to<br />

understand <strong>Socrates</strong>' justice. What was it that it could come to sight,<br />

or permit <strong>Socrates</strong> to come to sight, as "transcending justice" in the<br />

manner indicated in the first two chapters, or how is it related to<br />

justice as comm<strong>on</strong>ly understood?<br />

On Chapter Three<br />

In his discussi<strong>on</strong> of Chapter III, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Strauss</str<strong>on</strong>g> no l<strong>on</strong>ger speaks explicitly<br />

5. Cf. 102-which refers to 98-with what is suggested by <strong>Socrates</strong>' attitude toward<br />

sacrifices (102). Kritoboulos's frivolity (102), or his sharing to some extent in <strong>Socrates</strong>'<br />

frivolity, was no doubt <strong>on</strong>e of the reas<strong>on</strong>s why <strong>Socrates</strong> found his company pleasant<br />

(cf. 109 and also <strong>Socrates</strong>' comments about Herm<strong>on</strong>genes in Symposium 6.1-4 and<br />

4.46-50).

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