Strauss on Xenophon's Socrates Xenophon's Socratic Discourse: An ...

142 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER
Chapters XVII and XVIII of the text), the central paragraph on the
farming section, introduces a new theme into the discussion of that
section: theology, or Socrates' interest in theology. At the same time,
the treatment of the theme knowledge continues, so that there are
two themes to this paragraph too; theology takes the place of justice.
The nature of the connection between theology and justice is indicated
by <strong>Strauss</strong>'s treatment of a Socratic reference to divine
punishment. By thinking through just punishment, we see that the
bad consequences of an action men are compelled to take cannot be
regarded as divine punishment. Further reflection on justice would
no doubt bring out this connection more fully; but in order to be
able to undertake that reflection, one would have had to become
aware of the inadequacy of one's knowledge of justice. The theme
knowledge is treated here in connection with the question of agreement.
<strong>Strauss</strong> raises the question whether the agreement between
Ischomachos and Socrates, reached at the end of the previous
chapter, " is based in all points on the fact that both possess the required
knowledge; perhaps on some points they only happen to have
the same opinion" (187). Later on in the paragraph, <strong>Strauss</strong> refers to
Socrates' tracing universal agreement to the teaching of the god and
to his tracing disagreement as well to the god's action. <strong>Strauss</strong> then
asks whether "all universal agreement, as well as the lack of it,"
must "be traced to the god or the gods" (188). This question is
answered by the suggestion which <strong>Strauss</strong> ventures to include in the
next paragraph, "that Socrates and Ischomachos genuinely agree
only if they are not taught by the god or if their wisdom is only
wisdom concerning human things, or human wisdom" (188) . As can
be seen in the case of justice, agreement regarding human things is
not without bearing on agreement regarding divine things. Each of
the following three paragraphs indicated that a connection may exist
between ignorance and knowledge, that one may have
knowledge of one's ignorance and that this presupposes that one has
some knowledge of other things as well (cf. also 193). Is human
wisdom, at least in part, such knowledge of ignorance? More
precisely, these paragraphs show Socrates' awareness of his ignorance
regarding crucial elements of farming, 1 ° while leaving it
18. The central one of these paragraphs seems to show this less clearly than the two
which surround it -"he does not even raise the question" (190). On the other hand, it
may contain a reference to the "right of the stronger" and thus remind us of the issue of
justice (189-190; cf. 123).