Strauss on Xenophon's Socrates Xenophon's Socratic Discourse: An ...

STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 105
The reflection we are concerned with began with the observation
that one cannot learn how to manage well one's own household
without learning at the same time how to manage well that of one's
neighbor. The knowledge or art of managing the household is
"transferable to what is not one's own" (93) or is indifferent to the
distinction between mine and thine. To understand Socrates' indifference
to that distinction however this observation must be supplemented
by a line of reasoning based on the further observation
that we mean by possession or property something good. This means
that only those of our possessions which are good or useful to us really
belong to us. Furthermore, it is especially knowledge which
makes things useful. This would seem to mean that only a knower
can truly possess anything. For example, if there are things legally
mine which I do not know how to use, they are not truly mine; they
may even be the property of another, one who knows how to use
them and who would, therefore, have a perfect right to make
whatever use he might choose of those things, which are, after all,
his property. But what use should he make of them? That is, this line
of reasoning is still insufficient or incomplete because it fails to indicate
for whose benefit the knower should use "his" property. But
in fact this is already settled once one recognizes the necessity of
looking at things "from the point of view of the good as distinguished
from that of justice." Lest there be any doubt on this point, <strong>Strauss</strong>
makes it clear that the thought that a wise man would "make use of
his property, i.e., of all things, by distributing it properly according
to the needs or merits of his fellow men" is unacceptable-unacceptable
because the choice of such a troublesome and even miserable
life . would, as such, be an unwise choice (97). It is only for this
reason (to avoid unnecessary trouble and misery), <strong>Strauss</strong> gives us to
understand, and because he needs for himself (not indeed nothing,
but) very little, that the wise man or philosopher is a respecter of
law and property as ordinarily understood.
It is likely to be some time before these thoughts-which <strong>Strauss</strong>
arrives at "by thinking through Socrates' argument with
Kritoboulos" (97) and which he all but "fully states" though Socrates
had left matters at merely suggesting them (96)-sink in, in their
deep and troubling import, In the meantime, we cannot help being
struck by the fact that <strong>Strauss</strong>, who expresses only a prudential
reservation regarding Socrates' "silence" on justice or legality
(96-97), appears to regard Socrates' related "silence" on piety as
detracting from the truthfulness of the account of household