Strauss on Xenophon's Socrates Xenophon's Socratic Discourse: An ...

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136 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER contrives to make the central one in his discussion of the first chapter of the section) to the incompleteness of Ischomachos's enumeration of the kinds of continence required of stewards, he says, "Perhaps Xenophon merely indicates by this that something of importance is consciously omitted by him but unconsciously omitted by Ischomachos" (170). In other words, Ischomachos forgot about a kind of continence that is necessary. In his discussion of the next chapter, however, <strong>Strauss</strong> points out that the workers' possession of continence of the omitted kind would make it more difficult to secure their obedience, while he adds that the treatment of stewards does not differ much from that of workers. Here then is the solution to Ischomachos's omission, a solution which suggests that the omission does him credit. Yet <strong>Strauss</strong> says merely, "Perhaps this explains his silence in the preceding chapter on continence regarding the belly," the kind of continence in question (172-173). Only in the context of the larger problem of the section do these hints begin to make sense. If Socrates' inability to rule stems ultimately from the unteachability of continence, that inability would appear to have nothing to do with any difficulty Socrates might have in dealing with Ischomachos and his kind: can not Ischomachos be presumed to be a model of continence and therefore, as far as that goes (cf. 176), of teachability with respect to virtue. Or is this presumption precisely what <strong>Strauss</strong> wishes to call into question? Is it perhaps characteristic of Ischomachos to forget to some extent about continence? (cf. 193 n.2, on Socrates' relative avoidance of mention of "the vine and its fruit," with 198 n.3 and context. Regarding continence of the belly in particular, cf. VII.6 and, for <strong>Strauss</strong>'s understanding of this passage, 151.) The central paragraph in <strong>Strauss</strong>'s discussion of the first chapter of the stewardship section has one other theme in addition to continence: piety or the gods. These themes seem to be linked in <strong>Strauss</strong>'s work on the Oeconomicus as early as his treatment of Chapter I. Socrates, apparently wishing to avoid an admission that piety is necessary to the successful. management of the household, gives the impression that he maintains that "possession of a household" knowledge of how to increase it, and willingness to work hard and shrewdly to this effect are the "complete conditions" for such success (98). In this context, he identifies a sort of man, whom we would be likely to call incontinent as a slave. <strong>Strauss</strong> renders his explanation as follows: "a man who wishes to be rich and does not wish to work toward that end is irrational; his thought is obscured by beings whose slave he is or who
STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 137 rule him" (98). Kritoboulos, not implausibly, assumes that Socrates refers to invisible rulers. Yet Socrates denies this, saying that he means, among other things, vices "like softness of the soul" (98). The incontinent, then, are slaves, however well-born or conventionally free they may be (which is not to say that all slaves are incontinent). Can <strong>Strauss</strong>, who has already referred in this context to praying, be suggesting that in many cases piety is supported by incontinence in the form of softness of soul? (cf., with 102, Thoughts on Machiavelli, 211). Incontinence in general, perhaps more than anything else (cf. 176), limits the teachability of virtue in either sense of the term (113-114, 161, 175, 176). Yet, as we have seen in the case of the stewards, and as we suspect in the case of Ischomachos himself, virtue of the Ischomachean variety is compatible with some incontinence. This may not be the case, however, with that "true human virtue" which, according to <strong>Strauss</strong>, "is not in the need of conventions" (160). Incontinence in a form compatible and more than compatible with Ischomachean virtue may well be an irremovable barrier to the acquisition and therefore the teaching of Socratic virtue. At the very outset of his discussion of the stewardship chapters, <strong>Strauss</strong> observes, on the basis of a remark of Socrates, that "Socrates seems to have learned everything about perfect gentlemanship that he wished to learn," by the time the discussion of stewards begins (167). In all likelihood then, he already knew, prior to his conversation with Ischomachos, of the limited teachability of virtue (see especially 168-169) or of the limits of his power of speaking (177). Very frequently in these chapters, Socrates is "surprised" by claims of Ischomachos to be able to teach things which Socrates doubts can be taught (167, 168, 171, 174); but those claims tend not to receive very impressive support. Or, as <strong>Strauss</strong> puts it, " prior to his conversation with Ischomachos, Socrates already possessed a better understanding of education than did the perfect gentleman" (168-169). That his power to teach through speaking was limited-it was not to learn this that Socrates sought a conversation with Ischomachos, which is no doubt one of the reasons why this limitation does not "become the theme in the Oeconomicus" (177) . Nevertheless, as brought to light and examined in the stewardship section, this limitation tells us something about the conversation he did seek, about the constraints which in most cases place limits on its progress and about its hazards. One can perhaps put the difficulty this way. The philosopher as philosopher can never rule the majority of
Page 1 and 2: Strauss on Xenopho
Page 3 and 4: STRAUSSON XENOPHON 101 dary one fro
Page 5 and 6: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 103 On the Titl
Page 7 and 8: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 105 The reflect
Page 9 and 10: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON prehensive and
Page 11 and 12: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 109 of Socrates
Page 13 and 14: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 111 portant and
Page 15 and 16: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 113 not equally
Page 17 and 18: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 115 "the noble"
Page 19 and 20: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON Strauss
Page 21 and 22: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON On Chapters Sev
Page 23 and 24: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 121 concerned i
Page 25 and 26: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 123 planation."
Page 27 and 28: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON quite badly (cf
Page 29 and 30: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 127 for it" (13
Page 31 and 32: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON it is useful fo
Page 33 and 34: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON "Ischomachos's
Page 35 and 36: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 133 useful to h
Page 37: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON through thinkin
Page 41 and 42: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 139 By his trea
Page 43 and 44: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON Ischomachos's a
Page 45 and 46: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON uncertain wheth
Page 47 and 48: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON truth and those
Page 49 and 50: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 147 of the teac
Page 51 and 52: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 149 On page 74,
Page 53 and 54: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 151 firm the co
Page 55: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 153 sort of the

Strauss on Xenophon's Socrates Xenophon's Socratic Discourse: An ...

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