Strauss on Xenophon's Socrates Xenophon's Socratic Discourse: An ...

STRAUSS ON XENOPHON
through thinking what is pious, what is impious, what is noble,
what is base, and so on, or who considers thoroughly the just and
unjust things" (175-176).
But this is merely another way of expressing the point-regarding
Ischomachos's expectation or hopes of support for the noble way of
life-which has already been made in the section on the wife. In
speaking of a deepening of the confrontation between the two ways
of life, <strong>Strauss</strong> must have in mind then the second point that he
makes in this context: " . . . Socrates differs from Ischomachos .. .
by the fact that he is not a man capable of ruling" (177; cf. 166, on
Socrates' powers in argument, with the repetition on 176). Since this
fact emerged from a consideration of what it takes to rule slaves (see
especially 172 as well as 169) and means primarily that Socrates is
unable to rule salves, we are unlikely to see its significance-why
should Socrates even wish to rule slaves?-unless we connect it with
<strong>Strauss</strong>'s first point: the similarity between Ischomachos and his
stewards (cf. 102). <strong>Strauss</strong> also reminds us here of Socrates' "accusers
and condemners" (176), who were of course free men (only) in the
Ischomachean sense (cf. 104-105 and the references on 171 and 174
to "Socrates' view that there is no essential difference between
despotic rule and rule over free men." The central paragraph of
<strong>Strauss</strong>'s discussion of the stewardship section deals with what is required
for the ruling of slaves. The following paragraph calls attention
to the fact that the stewards, too, are slaves; while the next two
paragraphs bring out the similarity between Ischomachos and some
of his stewards).
Socrates' inability to rule slaves stemmed from his inability or unwillingness
to use coercion (177 n. 10; cf. 172). One can say that his
ruling was limited to teaching, provided that one adds that
teaching, without coercion, may be ineffective in many cases:
"Teaching not accompanied by coercion or, more precisely, by
despotic power is insufficient for the education of stewards" (169).
The need for coercion or despotic power stems in part from the
limited teachability of diligence, which may be assumed to be "at
least an indispensable ingredient of every virtue" (168); and the
limited teachability of diligence is due at least in part to the fact that
the one who is to learn it must already possess various sorts of continence
(168; cf. 169-170, 172-173). Not even Ischomachos suggests
that continence is teachable. <strong>Strauss</strong>'s treatment of the theme "continence"
is perhaps the strangest feature of his discussion of the
chapters on stewardship. After calling attention (in a paragraph he
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