Strauss on Xenophon's Socrates Xenophon's Socratic Discourse: An ...

126 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER
as to whether this view of marriage is completely in accord with
human nature and especially with the nature of such a spirited
woman as Ischomachos's wife (153, 155; cf. 152). Such a doubt certainly
had arisen in Socrates' mind; but apparently it did not arise
with sufficient force in Ischomachos's mind. In this and also in other
Given the status in his eyes of the noble and the law which
establishes it Ischomachos expects that there must be some support
for that. (This already implies, it is true, some awareness of the
problem on his part, of the fact that the law is in need of support.)
In order to grasp his thought, one must give proper weight to the
fact that "Ischomachos does not ascribe divine origin to the law"
(135; cf. 148). He distinguishes between the law and what the gods
are responsible for: " What the gods have generated, what owes its
being to the gods, is `nature' as distinguished in particular from law"
(135). His primary and fundamental concern is for law (or the
noble) not the gods or nature. Nevertheless, this primary concern
forces him to extend his concern beyond it: therefore, " `Nature' and
`law' make their first appearance in the Oeconomicus in the same
context, in the same chapter" (135; cf. On Tyranny 109; cf. the
references on 135 and 137 to praise and blame). Another formulation
of the problem is suggested by <strong>Strauss</strong>'s observation on 156 and
152: while Ischomachos could have admitted that the other sorts of
order he discusses are improvements on nature, he cannot afford to
admit that the law is an improvement on-i.e., deviation
from-nature, precisely because it is only a qualified improvement.
In accord with this, Ischomachos stresses to his wife the "perfect
agreement between nature [i.e., divinely originated nature] and
law" regarding the role of the two sexes in marriage: "the law puts
the stamp of the noble on the specific actions for which the god has
designed the two sexes . . ." (137). It is true that Ischomachos's accounts
of the gods' provision for marriage (135-138) and of the gods'
fashioning the nature of the woman for her part of the couple's work
(137) are less than convincing, and that Ischomachos seems to be
aware of this (137), just as he is aware that the noble is in need of
support. More generally, "Ischomachos indicates some doubts
regarding the teleotheology" which he puts forward here (149). For
example, since he regards the drone bees as useless, he "does not see
why, and even whether, the god has fashioned them" (138).
Moreover, he believes that "if a man acts against the divine or
natural order by neglecting his work or doing that of the wife, his
disorderly conduct is perhaps noticed by the gods and he is punished