Strauss on Xenophon's Socrates Xenophon's Socratic Discourse: An ...

STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 147
of the teaching of Chapter XX taken as a part of the conclusion to
the whole work. We will concentrate on this aspect of his discussion.
The Oeconomicus concludes, in Chapter XXI, with Ischomachos's
praise of rule over willing subjects as "something divine that is given
to those who have been truly initiated into the mysteries of moderation"
(207) and with his blame of "tyrannical rule over unwilling
subjects," which he regards as "no less a divine gift than ruling over
willing subjects" but a gift which "is given by the gods . . . to those
whom they regard as worthy to live the life of Tantalus in Hades
." (208). This final teaching (among other things) would appear
to place the Oeconomicus in sharp contrast to the Hiero, which
"ends with strongly worded praise of the tyrant who rules over willing
subjects" (209). To put the teaching of the Hiero in the terms
used by Ischomachos in the Oeconomicus, there is nothing in principle
to prevent rule over willing subjects from being given to a tyrant
who, as "a man who has in the past committed innumerable crimes"
(209), is not likely to have been "truly initiated into the mysteries of
moderation." In accord with this difference between the two works,
the teaching of the Hiero is entrusted not to Socrates but to
Simonides, a wise man of a very different stripe than Socrates and in
particular a man "who can always find refuge with a tyrant, since
he is not attached to his fatherland" (209).
The appearance of opposition between the two works is to some extent
misleading however. "Both dialogues are narrated by
Xenophon" (209), i.e., to that extent he takes responsibility for
them, for bringing them to our attention: Xenophon's "instincts," as
we were told earlier, are "controlled by his admiration for Socrates"
(203). Socrates, for his part, "remains altogether silent" in response
to the speech of Ischomachos which conflicts with the teaching of
the Hiero (205). Moreover, a somewhat different view of the relation
between Hiero and Oeconomicus has been presented in the
discussion of Chapter XX. <strong>Strauss</strong> took up again there a remark of
Ischomachos which carried an implicit criticism of Socrates:
"Precisely because the knowledge required for farming is easily
available to everyone and therefore what makes the difference between
the good and the bad farmer is not knowledge but diligence,
farming, or rather the earth which in its justice treats well those who
treat it well, is the reliable accuser, not only of a bad farmer, but of
a bad soul" (198-199; cf. 104). But in examining the question "what
is it that makes human beings diligent" (199), <strong>Strauss</strong> reached the
conclusion that the motive of Ischomachos himself, or at least of his