Strauss on Xenophon's Socrates Xenophon's Socratic Discourse: An ...

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140 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER stewardship section, Socrates refrains from using the term "just": he was reluctant, apparently, to accept as justice "abstaining from another man's property" (178; cf. 95-97). Second, Ischomachos has some difficulty in understanding what Socrates is after, because "he did not think that Socrates could be interested in farming" (179). The third paragraph returns to the theme of the first, the distinction between art as a kind of knowledge and what is not art. The question is raised whether Ischomachos's "knowledge" of how to produce in his stewards (among other things) "justice" is not an art (179). Knowledge of how to produce justice in someone would, however, necessarily include knowledge of what justice is. We are not surprised therefore to learn in this same paragraph that it is the art of farming which is "the apparently most important cognitive ingredient" of Ischomachos's life (180)-which could hardly be the case if he knew also how to make someone just. In this paragraph <strong>Strauss</strong> also alludes again to the fact or probability that Socrates is reluctant to farm. His reluctance is still more emphasized in the fourth paragraph: Socrates refuses to accept the suggestion that farming is philanthropic (cf. 121-122). Nevertheless, in repeating his summary of the stewardship section, Socrates indicates a greater interest than before in taking up farming. <strong>Strauss</strong> links this to another change in Socrates' summary: "he says now that the steward must be just" (181). If one accepts Ischomachos's view of what justice is, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Socrates must take up farming: "Surely a man circumstanced like Socrates can now no longer avoid desiring to learn the art of farming" (181; cf. 104). Just as the third paragraph alluded to Socrates' reluctance to farm, the fourth alludes to the theme of knowledge, in particular to Ischomachos's view of what constitutes knowledge. According to Ischomachos, farming can be understood in part "by watching men doing farm work" and in part "by hearing" (180). The first paragraph of the next chapter begins with the declaration "This much is clear: Socrates will not be a farmer, i.e., a practicing farmer, a farmer ` in deed' (182). The preparation <strong>Strauss</strong> has laid in the preceding chapter insures that this declaration will have the proper impact, although <strong>Strauss</strong> softens the blow for the time being by holding out the possibility that Socrates "may very well become an outstanding teacher of farming, a man who teaches farming through and through, most precisely, ìn speech' " (182; cf. 191). He thus at the same time brings in the theme of precision, or speech, or knowledge, or "theory." <strong>Strauss</strong> treats in this paragraph
STRAUSS ON XENOPHON Ischomachos's attack on those who treat farming too "theoretically"; Ischomachos's attack on the theorists forces him in the direction of adopting certain of their positions-in particular, their distrust of "hearsay" and their "emancipation from òne's own' " (183; cf. 95-97). It is safe to assume that Ischomachos adopts these positions only to a very limited extent. (For example, Ischomachos's "emancipation from òne's own' . . . might remind us" of that achieved by Socrates (183)-it is surely not identical to it.) The next paragraph deals with Ischomachos's view that in teaching Socrates farming, "he is not likely to teach Socrates anything new to him; his teaching will rather consist of reminding Socrates of what he knows already" (184). <strong>Strauss</strong> has already suggested by his references to "hearing" and "hearsay," that Ischomachos's understanding of what constitutes knowledge is rather loose; it would therefore be wrong here to accept Ischomachos's view of the state of Socrates' knowledge of farming without further consideration. And as for Ischomachos's contribution to Socrates' later view of teaching and learning-that view is, at most, the outcome of Socrates' "meditation on a thought first suggested to him by the practice of the perfect gentleman par excellence" (184). The final paragraph of this chapter, like the first, deals implicitly with justice (or Ischomachos's view of justice, or Socrates' non-acceptance of that view) as well as with knowledge. <strong>Strauss</strong> interprets a remark of Socrates to mean that, "The philosopher . . . is a man characterized by a conditional or qualified love of lucre. This love might induce him under certain conditions not specified by Socrates to strive to get the greatest possible harvest of crops; . under no circumstances does he wish to become a perfect gentleman, in the ordinary meaning of that expression." Socrates "is more concerned with lucre than with perfect gentlemanship'' (185). <strong>Strauss</strong> then speaks of two points regarding farming which Socrates proves to know, of a somewhat questionable inference drawn by Ischomachos from one of these points, and of the "similar" way in which Ischomachos and Socrates reach "full agreement" on the other points pertaining to the topic under discussion (186). The connection between the themes justice and knowledge would appear to be this: if Ischomachos's view of what constitutes knowledge is loose, he may regard knowledge of justice what is not knowledgeor be blind to the need to investigate the adequacy of his understanding of justice (cf. 165-166). The first paragraph of <strong>Strauss</strong>'s next chapter (which treats 141
Page 1 and 2: Strauss on Xenopho
Page 3 and 4: STRAUSSON XENOPHON 101 dary one fro
Page 5 and 6: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 103 On the Titl
Page 7 and 8: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 105 The reflect
Page 9 and 10: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON prehensive and
Page 11 and 12: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 109 of Socrates
Page 13 and 14: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 111 portant and
Page 15 and 16: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 113 not equally
Page 17 and 18: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 115 "the noble"
Page 19 and 20: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON Strauss
Page 21 and 22: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON On Chapters Sev
Page 23 and 24: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 121 concerned i
Page 25 and 26: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 123 planation."
Page 27 and 28: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON quite badly (cf
Page 29 and 30: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 127 for it" (13
Page 31 and 32: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON it is useful fo
Page 33 and 34: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON "Ischomachos's
Page 35 and 36: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 133 useful to h
Page 37 and 38: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON through thinkin
Page 39 and 40: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 137 rule him" (
Page 41: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 139 By his trea
Page 45 and 46: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON uncertain wheth
Page 47 and 48: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON truth and those
Page 49 and 50: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 147 of the teac
Page 51 and 52: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 149 On page 74,
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Page 55: STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 153 sort of the

Strauss on Xenophon's Socrates Xenophon's Socratic Discourse: An ...

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