Strauss on Xenophon's Socrates Xenophon's Socratic Discourse: An ...

114 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER
in the `Persian' chapter: transcending the city means transcending
justice" (123). Moreover, "Given the connection between justice and
piety, we ought not to be surprised to observe that the `Persian'
chapter, which is silent on justice, is silent also on piety or the gods,
while the present chapter, which mentions justice, speaks more than
once of the gods" (123). Indeed, in the most extensive statement on a
god in the chapter (which <strong>Strauss</strong> quotes in this context) the earth is
said, being a goddess, to teach justice (123). The "free man" whose
horizon is sketched here is of course a believer in the city's gods: part
of "the price one has to pay for the pleasures derived from farming"
is "sacrifices" (121-122).
In calling the case for farming which Socrates makes in the Persian
chapter more "dialogical" and less "didactic or rhetorical" than
the case which he makes in Chapter V, <strong>Strauss</strong> has in mind primarily
that Socrates' remarks in Chapter IV called forth four responses
by Kritoboulos, whereas "He does not once interrupt Socrates' long
speech " in Chapter V (121). Now three of those four responses were
occasioned by references to what Socrates "knew from hearsay"
about the Persian king (121-122); and references " to what is generally
thought to be, to what people say, to opinions, reputation,
rumor, hearsay, or authority . . . abounded" in the Persian
chapter, while "they are absent from Socrates' long speech" in
Chapter V (120). Perhaps then what <strong>Strauss</strong> means in the second
place by the dialogical character of Chapter IV is that "Socrates
adapts himself" there "to the needs, or the tastes, of Kritoboulos"
(115) or to the opinions held and represented by Kritoboulos. But
such adaptation would seem to characterize still more Chapter V,
the very turn to which was caused in part by Socrates' wish to beat a
tactical retreat from the position which had been reached by "going
beyond" the cities. Indeed, why should such a procedure be called
dialogical, rather than didactic or rhetorical? Moreover, this suggestion
takes no account of Socrates' concern, which <strong>Strauss</strong> goes out of
his way to mention in this vicinity, to find a standard "independent
of opinion and reputation" (121).
Perhaps then what <strong>Strauss</strong> has in mind in his characterization of
Chapter IV is this very movement "beyond `the cities' " which
distinguishes it from Chapter V-a movement based on, made possible
and even necessary by, an initial bowing to the opinions
prevalent in the cities or to the authority of the city. For Socrates
was "compelled" to go beyond the cities once he adopted as his
guiding consideration, in accordance with Kritoboulos's wishes,