Strauss on Xenophon's Socrates Xenophon's Socratic Discourse: An ...

STRAUSS ON XENOPHON 133
useful to human beings" (164). Apparently <strong>Strauss</strong> wished to speak
so emphatically of Socrates' turn to the human things only after having
cast it in the most innocent possible light. He does this toward
the close of a portion of his book in which he seems to have gone far
toward revealing the true intent and meaning of that turn; what he
does here is needed by way of compensating for that openness. For,
as <strong>Strauss</strong> has already stressed, even after his turn to the human
things, Socrates "did not limit his inquiry to the human things" (150,
my emphasis), i.e., his turn to the human things must be understood
in the light of his continuing concern with "the nature of all things"
(150). And there were, and may be again even if there are not now,
"those who condemn the study of nature as wicked" (164, cf. 154). 14
Insofar then as the Oeconomicus is a reply, in the manner indicated
by <strong>Strauss</strong>'s comparison, to Aristophanes' attack on Socrates in the
Clouds, it is only a "comical reply." But behind or informing the
comedy is the serious need to protect a pursuit which was made not
less, but perhaps even more hazardous by Socrates' turn to the
human things. Aristophanes' play may have helped draw Socrates'
or Xenophon's attention to this need (cf. Xenophon' Socrates 169).
The final subject of Chapter XI and the one <strong>Strauss</strong> appropriately
takes up next in his discussion is rhetoric. (In order to achieve. this
order, <strong>Strauss</strong> had to make his summarizing statement before "the
account of the perfect gentleman or the confrontation of the two incompatible
ways of life" had been completed 165.) The most important
points brought out appear to be these. Socrates, who spent "his
life considering the just and unjust things," "was not in any way
concerned with accusing others" (165-166); the opposite is shown to
be true of Ischomachos, of whose concern with punishment we saw
some evidence earlier (137 and 142-143; cf. 151). Ischomachos says
that "he cannot plead his cause well if it is useful to him to say the
untruth; swearing by Zeus, he says that he cannot make the weaker
argument the stronger one" (166; cf. Clouds 893-895). In his reply,
Socrates "corrects" Ischomachos, according to <strong>Strauss</strong>, i.e.,
disagrees with him, though he does so unobtrusively. The need to
defend or protect the Socratic way of life from those who would
misunderstand it (cf., e.g., 104-105) may make it impossible for
Socratic rhetoric to abide by such a limitation.
14. Cf. the observation, made for another purpose by David Bolotin in his review of
<strong>Strauss</strong>'s book on Plato's . Laws, that <strong>Strauss</strong>'s work shows his "exceptional freedom
from vestiges of the secular faith in progress." (American Political Science Review Vol.
71, 1977, 889)