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Driving While Intoxicated Case Law Update - Texas District ...

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Sledqe v. State ,1994 WL 247961 (Tex.App.-Dallas June 9, 1994, no pet.[Not designated for<br />

publication).<br />

The defendant testified that he changed lanes but only because the lane ended, "played out." The<br />

Court of Appeals held that the defendant was not entitled to an article 38.23 instruction because he<br />

did not dispute the officer's testimony about his weaving but, instead, sought to explain the reason<br />

he drove that way. Id. The Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence did not raise a factissue<br />

about whether the officer stopped the defendant.<br />

Bellv. State, 2005 WL 503647 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref'd)(mem. op., not designated<br />

for publication).<br />

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's denial of the defendant's request for an article 38.23<br />

instruction, noting that she did not contest the existence or nature of the evidence underlying the<br />

officer's decision to stop her. She merely challenged whether the circumsfances he obserued<br />

authorized the stop. Because only the effect of the underlying facts was disputed, the Court o.f<br />

Appeals held that the defendant was not entitled to an article 38.23 jury instruction.<br />

Beasley v. State, 810 S.W.2d 838, (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1991 , pet. ref'd).<br />

Where the arresting officers and the defendant testified that she was swerving and weaving<br />

between lanes on the highway, and the only issue was that the defendant offered an explanation<br />

that she swerued because she was trying to stop her children from fighting, the court held she was<br />

not entitled to the article 38.23 instruction she requested.<br />

S. PER SE DEFINITION OPTION SHOULD BE SUBMITTED-LIMITING<br />

INSTRUCTION<br />

IMPROPER<br />

Kirsch v. State, 306 S.W.3d 738 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010).<br />

It Was proper for the Trial Court to instruct the jury that it could find the defendant gui$ under the<br />

per se impairment definition of intoxication, despite the absence of retrograde extrapolation<br />

evidence. The defendant's blood test showed that he had a BAC of 0.10 at the hospital, 80 minutes<br />

afer he was irwolved in the car wreck. The results are evidence from which a jury could find the<br />

defendant guilty under the per se impairment definition. Trial Court's instruction in prosecution for<br />

driving while intoxicated (DWI), that jury could consider defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC) test<br />

result "for the limited purpose of showing that the individualfesfed had ingested alcohol only at<br />

some point before the time of the test," was misleading and an improper comment on the weight of<br />

the evidence; BAC test resultwas also probative to show that defendantwas intoxicated atthe time<br />

he was driving, even though it was not sufficient by itself to prove intoxication at the time of driving.<br />

Wilfiams v. State, 307 S.W.3d 862 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2010, no pet.).<br />

Even though BAC was .07 ninety minutes after the defendant's arrest and there was no<br />

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