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Driving While Intoxicated Case Law Update - Texas District ...

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J. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL BARS INTOXICATION MANSLAUGHTER TRIAL ON<br />

DIFFERENT INTOXICANT<br />

Ex Parte Taylor, 101 S.W.3d 434 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).<br />

After being acquitted of lntoxication Manslaughter where the theory of intoxication alleged was<br />

alcohol, the State tried to proceed on another case, different victim, and now adding marijuana as<br />

a possrble source of intoxication. Collateral Estoppel barred.State from relitigating ultimate issue<br />

of intoxication, regardless of whether Sfafe alleged different type of intoxicant.<br />

K. NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY WHERE FAULTY UNDERLYING DWl PRIOR<br />

ALLEGATION DENIES COURT JURISDICTION<br />

Gallemore v. State, 312 S.W.3d 156 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2010).<br />

After an open plea of guitty to fetony DWI and at a tater punishment hearing, the defense pointed<br />

out that one of the underlying DWI's that was alleged to make the charge a felony was a subseguenf<br />

not a previous conviction. The defense asked to be sentenced for the misdemeanor DWl. The<br />

Court instead granted a mistrial after stating it had no jurisdiction in the case. The State then reindicted<br />

and replaced the defective prior with a good one. The defense filed a writ stating that<br />

double jeopardy had attached in the former proceeding. The Court of Appeals held that double<br />

jeopardy principles do not forbid multiple trials of a single criminal charge if the first trial resulted in<br />

a mistrial that (1) was justified under the manifesf necessify doctrine; or (2) was requested or<br />

consented to by the defense, absent prosecutorial misconductwhich forced the mistrial. Ihis case<br />

fell under "manifest necessity" because the trial court did not have jurisdiction.<br />

XXVI. PUTTING DEFENDANT BEHIND THE WHEEL<br />

A. DEFENDANT STATEMENT THAT HE WAS DRIVER = SUFFICIENTLY<br />

CORROBORATED<br />

Nieschwietz v. State, 2006 WL 1684739 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. ref'd).<br />

In this case, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that he was<br />

drivinq on a public highway while intoxicated, because his extrajudicial confessio n on the videOtape<br />

(that he was making a turn when the other car hit him) was not conoborated by other evidence. The<br />

Court found that the defendant's admission in the videotape that he was driving the vehicle was<br />

sufficiently corroborated by his presence atthe scene, the vehicle insurance documents listing him<br />

as owner of the vehicle, and the officer's opinion based on his investigation that defendantwasthe<br />

driver.<br />

Frye v. State,2004 WL 292660 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.) (Not designated for publication).<br />

Trooper who was dispatched fo scene of accident saw defendant leaning against bed of pickup<br />

truck. Asked if he was okay, the defendant replied he was "going too fast to negotiate the corner<br />

and he wrecked the vehicle." He did not say how long he had been at the scene. He'appeared<br />

intoxicated and admitted to having had some beers while he was fishing earlier that day. No fishing<br />

1"48

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