Cognitive Semantics : Meaning and Cognition

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SPACE AND TIME 143 moment represented by the locus closest to the signer is earlier in time than the moment represented by the locus farther away. Even though the same configuration of loci can be used to express locative and temporal relations and both are static, there is thus a difference between the locative and the temporal use of space. In order to get the proper assignment of earlier and later in time, the receiver needs the dynamic notion of either the individual moving in time or time moving towards the individual in the canonical encounter. This difference between the two uses of space in sign language underlines the role of the cognitive difference between static situations and dynamic events in the description of temporal expressions, no matter whether these are semantically static or dynamic. 5 4. Time and space: A metaphorical relation? The preceding sections give ample evidence that the linguistic devices used to express temporal relations and the linguistic devices used to express spatial relations are related in systematic ways. We cannot explain temporal expressions without reference to the perceiving human being in space, either as an individual moving along or as an individual “facing” time in the canonical encounter. But does that mean that temporal expressions are derived metaphorically from spatial expressions? The answer to this question depends on whether time and space constitute two different domains. In order to maintain that temporal expressions are metaphorically derived from spatial expressions, we need to claim that the two areas constitute different cognitive domains and that the domain of space is more basic than the domain of time. I am going to argue that time and space cannot be analyzed as separate domains, a fact that is reflected in many linguistic expressions. It seems, however, that both time and space are conceptualized at different levels, which makes it possible to talk about space-to-time metaphors as well as time-to-space metaphors at some levels. Langacker defines a domain as “[a] context for the characterization of a semantic unit” (1987: 147). Domains are cognitive entities, and a concept is defined in terms of the contexts or domains needed to characterize the concept. Domains are themselves concepts, and they are hierarchically organized in the sense that a concept is characterized by a number of domains that can themselves be characterized in terms of further domains. Basic domains are
144 ELISABETH ENGBERG-PEDERSEN domains that cannot be characterized in terms of any other domains. Langacker finds that both time and space are “primitive dimension[s] of cognitive representation” (1987: 148; see also Langacker 1991). He characterizes the use of spatial terms to talk about time as metaphor, but also claims that time is in some sense more fundamental than space: “[T]he conception of spatial relationships involves scanning, which requires processing time, and our notions of spatial extension are intimately bound up with time-extended physical actions (e.g. movement and the manipulation of objects).” (Langacker 1987: 149). The idea that time and space are interwoven in perception is developed by Gibson in an article with the title ‘Events are Perceivable But Time is Not’ (1975). Gibson points out that it has long been a problem to psychologists how human beings and animals can perceive space: how can an observer see the third dimension, depth? Based on results of experiments with perception, he claims that the question is a false one. There is no such thing as depth perception or perception of space. All there is is perception of textured surfaces and their layout. The problem is now how we can perceive that portion of the layout of the world that is temporarily out of sight. The answer is: through the motions of objects, the locomotion of the observer, and the fact that what goes out of sight during one displacement will come into sight during the opposite displacement. All this has to do with time. But we can perceive time as little as we can perceive space. What we perceive are events and locomotions occurring in an environment that is rigid and permanent. Three kinds of events are possible: the repositioning of objects, the reshaping of surfaces, and the annihilation or creation of surfaces. All three involve some persistence and some change. The repositioning of an object such as an apple falling, for instance, leaves the shape and size of the object intact and the background surfaces invariant, but changes the pattern of the environment. Gibson concludes that “[t]ime and space are concepts, abstracted from the percepts of events and surfaces. They are not perceived, and they are not prerequisite to perceiving. Time and space are intellectual achievements, not perceptual categories.” (Gibson 1975: 299). Gibson furthermore points out that the theory of event perception implies a rejection of the division of the stream of awareness into a past, a present, and a future (1975: 300). He does acknowledge the feeling of now and attributes it to the perception of the body of the observer as distinguished from the environment. It comes from the visual perception of the observer’s locomo-
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COGNITIVE SEMANTICS
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COGNITIVE SEMANTICS MEANING AND COG
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“I KNOW, WE WON’T REVOLUTIONIZE
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viii PREFACE In this book, which re
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x PREFACE different mechanisms of s
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2 JENS ALLWOOD (1974). A meaning po
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4 JENS ALLWOOD types (iii), (vi) an
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6 JENS ALLWOOD operations which can
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8 JENS ALLWOOD the sentence John lo
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10 JENS ALLWOOD leva i (live in) X
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12 JENS ALLWOOD II. Semantic-episte
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14 JENS ALLWOOD State abstract obje
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16 JENS ALLWOOD by forming krig-are
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SOME TENETS OF COGNITIVE SEMANTICS
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1. Introduction FUNCTION, COGNITION
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FUNCTION, COGNITION, AND LAYERED CL
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FROM VISION TO COGNITION 67 From Vi
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knowledge, and non-understanding, e
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Table 2. Visual perception FROM VIS
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6. Results of the lexical survey FR
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FROM VISION TO COGNITION 75 genomse
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kunskaper ‘knowledge’ vetande
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FROM VISION TO COGNITION 79 trångs
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7. Being opaque → being abstruse,
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FROM VISION TO COGNITION 83 3. Caus
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FROM VISION TO COGNITION 85 Table 3
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88 ÅKE VIBERG dynamic (aspectual,
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90 ÅKE VIBERG The organization of
Page 103 and 104: 92 ÅKE VIBERG The hierarchical str
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Page 107 and 108: 96 ÅKE VIBERG but there is also a
Page 109 and 110: 98 ÅKE VIBERG corresponds to an En
Page 111 and 112: 100 ÅKE VIBERG III. Focusing of va
Page 113 and 114: 102 ÅKE VIBERG Another extended se
Page 115 and 116: 104 ÅKE VIBERG Och sen en stark r
Page 117 and 118: 106 ÅKE VIBERG Man slås ju av att
Page 119 and 120: 108 ÅKE VIBERG The second use of s
Page 121 and 122: 110 ÅKE VIBERG “Kaffe”, säger
Page 123 and 124: 112 ÅKE VIBERG The disconnection (
Page 125 and 126: 114 ÅKE VIBERG ‘at poker’ Per
Page 127 and 128: 116 ÅKE VIBERG Han slog ihop matse
Page 129 and 130: 118 ÅKE VIBERG Table 10. The lexic
Page 131 and 132: 120 ÅKE VIBERG Våld våld våld.
Page 133 and 134: 122 ÅKE VIBERG Table 12. Major cla
Page 135 and 136: 124 ÅKE VIBERG Table 13. The lexic
Page 137 and 138: 126 ÅKE VIBERG Han rev loss en sid
Page 139 and 140: 128 ÅKE VIBERG References Aijmer,
Page 142 and 143: SPACE AND TIME 131 Space and Time E
Page 144 and 145: SPACE AND TIME 133 visual perceptio
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Page 148 and 149: SPACE AND TIME 137 mal] with the va
Page 150 and 151: SPACE AND TIME 139 The articulatory
Page 152 and 153: SPACE AND TIME 141 in relation to a
Page 156 and 157: SPACE AND TIME 145 tion through the
Page 158 and 159: SPACE AND TIME 147 temporal sense (
Page 160 and 161: Notes SPACE AND TIME 149 1. In talk
Page 162 and 163: SPACE AND TIME 151 Johnson, M. 1987
Page 164 and 165: 1. Introduction CONCEPTUAL ENGINEER
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Page 168 and 169: CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING 157 The exam
Page 170 and 171: CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING 159 The firs
Page 172 and 173: CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING 161 But when
Page 174 and 175: CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING 163 Figure 8
Page 176 and 177: CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING 165 Let us f
Page 178 and 179: CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING 167 can be f
Page 180 and 181: Suggesting Figure 13. Params Evalua
Page 182: References CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING 1
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Page 187 and 188: 176 JORDAN ZLATEV learner’s behav
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194 JORDAN ZLATEV Small, S., Cottre
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196 INDEX OF NAMES Husserl, E. 4 J
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A abstract 132 Abstract agent 11 ab
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possible worlds 19, 21, 26, 31 post
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22. AUER, Peter and Aldo Di LUZIO (
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69. NOH, Eun-Ju: The Semantics and
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