PROCLUS, THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR

[146] mortal nature, not in consequence of
everything mortal being evil, but because these
evils also are adorned by the order of the
universe, and especially by the heavens. Hence
these, after imparting essence to generated
natures, cause them likewise to participate of
eternity. But to the bodies which have a
rectilinear motion, they give circular periods,
and impart order to things inordinate, bound to
things indefinite, and goodness to everything
that is evil. Everything, therefore, which is
according to nature, and exists always, is
generated from a definite cause. But evil is not
according to nature. For neither is there a
producing principle of lameness in nature, nor
of a deviation from art in art. How, therefore, is
it possible to investigate an immoveable
principle, and a producing cause of evils in
forms, since everything which derives its
existence from them is a form and an end; but
the nature of evils is of itself infinite and
undefined ?
In the third place, therefore, let us direct our
attention to the soul which we denominate
malefic, and consider whether or not we must
ascribe to this the cause of all evils. Shall we
say, then, that as it is essentially the province
of fire to heat, but not to refrigerate anything,
—and of other things, there is another
employment,—so likewise it essentially
pertains to this malefic soul to generate evils,
and to infect with evil everything to which it is
proximate ? Or shall we admit that the nature
of it is always good, but that its energies subsist
differently according to the same order, a
different [147] energy producing a different
life? If, therefore, it should be said that these
indeed are malefic, it must be granted that it is
malefic, not because, it is an irrational soul, but
because it is better than this, and through which
it is good. For to this soul there is a
transmutation of habit to the better and the