PROCLUS, THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR

participations should not be the same; that all
should participate, indeed, on account of coordination;
but not of the same things, on
account of order, which causes some things to
be first, others to be second, and others to be
successive to these. For, as Plato says, every
power which is motive of greater, is much
more motive of less things, and obtaining
dominion over stronger, it will much more
predominate over more [28] debile natures.
There a , however, will concurring with power, it
is necessary that Providence should extend its
beneficent care to things of a less excellent
nature. For it must not be said, that Providence
is able indeed, but unwilling, to effect what it is
able to effect; since whatever good men are
able to accomplish, they also wish to
accomplish. Nor is the power of Providence
without will, nor its will without power; since
the latter would render appetition vain b , and
the former would cause power to be imperfect.
If, however, it is requisite that Providence
should extend itself to secondary, it is much
more necessary that it should extend itself to
primary natures. For it does not pertain to
Providence to profit and adorn less excellent
beings, but leave such as are more excellent
destitute of itself. For if more excellent beings
are not in want of anything, they derive this
superiority to any kind of indigence from
Providence, which imparts to primary beings
the power of being sufficient to themselves.
Our common conceptions, therefore, as we
have before said, necessarily proclaim, that we
should assert Providence to be the cause of all
good, and that we should confess that the
power by which any being is sufficient to itself
is thence derived, and subsists for its sake.
Whether, therefore, beings are indigent, they
a i. e. with Providence.