PROCLUS, THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR

which is posterior to itself, but being itself
impartible;—in this case, it would say, I
possess the whole of this partibility impartibly;
not existing separately from either, but
containing that which is subordinate in that
which is more excellent; so that neither is the
distribution without a cause, nor does it preexist
in the cause [distri-
a It appears to me that in this place, immediately after
the. words in Morbeka's version, "et to indeterminatum
esse propter illius naturam," it is requisite to add,
Dicimus tamen ut Providentia, &c. For in what follows,
Proclus gives his own opinion, and not that of the
ancients.
[12]
butedly], but it subsists there according to
cause, and in its participants, according to
hyparxis. And if, indeed, it should investigate
the cause of that partition, it would find it in
itself, because in itself it is impartible; but
when it becomes situated in another subject,
and not in itself, it is the source to them of a
distribution into parts, in consequence of which
each of the parts is not everywhere. After this
manner therefore we say, that Providence being
the cause of all things, knows the things of
which it is the cause, has a definite knowledge
both of that which is definite and of that which
is indefinite, and gives generation to things
which will have an indefinite subsistence. Nor
does anything impossible happen on account of
this, [the indefiniteness existing in things
posterior to Providence a ,] in whose knowledge
they are antecedently comprehended, and in
such a way as is adapted to causes. But this is
now manifest.
3. In the third place, the doubt consequent to
this deserves to be considered, since it likewise
requires much attention; viz. if Providence is
the cause both of things definite and indefinite,
whether it is the cause of both these according
to one and the same thing, or according to