PROCLUS, THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR

some things, and produce others [contrary to
his will]; since will and productive energy are
simultaneous in divine essences. Hence, evil is
not only contrary to the will of the Demiurgus,
but is likewise unhypostatic; not because he did
not produce it, (for it is not lawful to conceive
that he did,) but because he was willing, in
short, that it should not exist. What, therefore,
can cause evil to have an existence, after the
father of all things has brought it to a perfectly
non-existent state ? For what is there contrary
to him, and whence does it derive its being ?
For that which is malefic is not from divinity,
(since it is not lawful to admit that it is,) and it
would be absurd to suppose that it is derived
from anything else. For everything which the
world contains proceeds from the father of it,
either immediately—and these are selfsubsistent
natures—or mediately, through the
energies of other superior powers.
And such is the reasoning which exterminates
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evil from existence; and such are the arguments
which may with probability be adduced. But he
who asserts the contrary to this will require us
to look to the hypostasis of things, and to direct
our attention to intemperance and injustice, and
whatever else we are accustomed to call the
evil of the soul. He will also ask us whether we
call each of these good, or each of them evil.
For if we admit that each of these is good, we
must necessarily say one of two things, either
that virtue is not contrary to vice, the whole to
the whole, and the parts likewise analogously,
or that what opposes good is not always evil.
But what can be more contrary to common
sense than each of these, or less congruous to
the nature of things? For the virtues oppose the
vices, and the manner in which this opposition
subsists is evident from the hostile conduct of
men towards each other, viz. of the unjust