PROCLUS, THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR

eason remains within, but speaks in a debile
manner, in consequence of being surrounded
by all-various passions. These things, however,
will be considered by us again.
But if, as we have said, it is not only requisite
that the above-mentioned arguments should
have been adduced, but that the doctrine
concerning the existence of evil should be
unfolded from the writings of Plato, what has
been already delivered by us is sufficient even
for those who are only able [87] in a moderate
degree to comprehend discussions of this kind.
It is fit, however, in the same manner as in a
court of justice, that we should not only hear
the arguments of the contending parties, but
that we should offer some opinion of our own.
Let the following, therefore, if you please, be
our decision on the subject,—that evil is, as I
may say, twofold ; one, and that the first, being
real evil, unmingled with good; but the other
not being real, nor unmingled with the nature
of good. For with respect to good also, one
kind is primarily good, and, as it were, good
itself, and nothing else than good, being neither
intellect, nor intelligence, nor truly-existing
being; but another kind is mingled with other
things. And good is sometimes found
unmingled with privation, and sometimes is to
be seen mingled with it. For that which
sometimes participates of what is primarily
good, is complicated with what is not good;
because being itself, also, and the nature of
being, is in its highest subsistence trulyexisting
being; and being alone, but in its last
subsistence, is in a certain respect comingled
with non-being ; so that in consequence of
being replete with non-entity, it possesses more
of non-existence than of existence. And nonbeing
itself, which is in no respect whatever
another being, and is beyond the nature which
subsists accidentally, is neither able to subsist
according to itself, nor according to accident.