PROCLUS, THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR

More documents

Recommendations

Info

[173] that which is deprived of the nature of good to remain ? For neither is it possible for evil to exist, without having the appearance of its contrary, good; because all things, and even evil itself, are for the sake of good. To this we answer, that if all things are for the sake of good, Divinity is not the cause of evils. For evil, so far as evil, is not derived from thence, but from other causes, which, as we have before observed, generate not from power, but from debility. On which account, as it appears to me, Plato a , arranging all things about the King of a What is here asserted by Proclus is to be found in the second Epistle of Plato to Dionysius; and the whole of the passage to which he refers is as follows : [Greek omitted, ed.] There is an important difference between some parts of this passage as quoted by Proclus, and all the printed editions of it, which has not been noticed by any of the editors of Plato's Works. [Greek omitted, ed., see archive.org for a copy of this treatise] all, and asserting that all things are for his sake, and even such as are not good,—for they have the appearance of good,—calls this King the cause of all things, and the cause of every being. But he does not, indeed, call him the cause of evils, so far as they are evils, but so far as each of these is good, in consequence of ranking among beings. If, therefore, we rightly assert these things, both With these alterations, therefore, the whole passage will be in English as follows : " You say, according to his report, [i. e. the report of Archidemus,] that I have not sufficiently demonstrated to you the particulars respecting the first nature. I must speak to you therefore in enigmas, that in case the letter should meet with any casualties, either by land or sea, he who reads it may not understand [this part of its contents]. For these particulars are as follow: All things are situated about the King of all; and all things subsist for his sake; and he is the cause of all beautiful things. But second things are situated about that which is second, and such as are third about that which is third. The human soul,
therefore, extends itself about these, in order to learn what kind of things they are, looking to such natures as are allied to itself, none of which is sufficient for the purpose. But about the King himself, and the things of which I have spoken, there is nothing of this kind; since the soul alone speaks of that which is posterior to this. Indeed, O son of Dionysius and Doris, this your inquiry [about the first nature] is as of that which is endued with a certain quality, and such an inquiry is the cause of all evils *. Or, rather, it is a parturition respecting this ingenerated in the soul, from which he who is not liberated will never in reality acquire truth." Proclus has made some admirable observations on this passage in the above-mentioned part of his treatise on the Theology of Plato, to my translation of which I refer the English reader. * In translating this part of the passage in my Plato, I was misled by finding in Proclus kalon instead of kakon. And I did not discover the mistake till I had read the above-mentioned Treatise of Damascius [peri archon], which was not printed at the time of the publication of my translation of Plato, but long after. [175] all things will be derived from Providence, and evil will have a place among beings. Hence, also, the Gods produce evil, but they produce it as good; and, as possessing a transcendently united knowledge, they know all things, impartibly such as are partible, boniformly such as are evil; and multitude is known by them according to profound union. For there is one knowledge pertaining to soul, another to an intellectual nature, and another to the Gods themselves. And the first of these, indeed, is a self-motive, the second an eternal, and the third an ineffable and transcendently united knowledge, both knowing and producing all things by the one itself a . a See a most admirable confirmation of all that is said in this treatise On the Subsistence of Evil, by Proclus, in my translation of his Commentary on the Timaeus of Plato, vol. i. p. 311. [See archive.org for a copy of that work, and www.scribd.com/meuser for a proofread text version]
Page 1 and 2:
TWO TREATISES OF PROCLUS, THE PLATO
Page 3 and 4:
PREFACE. —♦— NO subjects of d
Page 5 and 6:
February. His version also of the v
Page 7 and 8:
auditors of the Gods, is a most man
Page 9 and 10:
espect perfect, but the other being
Page 11 and 12:
to a part, is different from that w
Page 13 and 14:
kind, but also every particular thi
Page 15 and 16:
which is posterior to itself, but b
Page 17 and 18:
and as the salvation of all things;
Page 19 and 20:
one; but body, on account of the in
Page 21 and 22:
to the form of the incorporeal esse
Page 23 and 24:
than in a greater time, as if the i
Page 25 and 26:
And if it should be said, that they
Page 27 and 28:
divinity; but conformably to his na
Page 29 and 30:
participations should not be the sa
Page 31 and 32:
must be admitted. For that it is mo
Page 33 and 34:
conformably to its energy; and in m
Page 35 and 36:
a Semper is wanting in this place i
Page 37 and 38:
variation in the energy of the Gods
Page 39 and 40:
the guardian care of the former is
Page 41 and 42:
preternatural exists in order that
Page 43 and 44:
called preter-rational and not pret
Page 45 and 46:
y its recipients a . For neither wo
Page 47 and 48:
ecause they do not obtain the same
Page 49 and 50:
frequently oppose the amatory energ
Page 51 and 52:
invented vulgar prosperities as the
Page 53 and 54:
espect to those who are dissimilar
Page 55 and 56:
who prefer that which is mortal in
Page 57 and 58:
Providence, viz. why punishments do
Page 59 and 60:
about these bodies, is perfectly sm
Page 61 and 62:
a The latter part of this sentence
Page 63 and 64:
celebrated unity, knowing and reduc
Page 65 and 66:
suspended from illuminations which
Page 67 and 68:
should dare to assert, that [73] it
Page 69 and 70:
[76] being; but that which particip
Page 71 and 72:
some things, and produce others [co
Page 73 and 74:
greater good, as neither is what is
Page 75 and 76:
less excellent part of its unity. F
Page 77 and 78:
such natures did not exist. If thes
Page 79 and 80:
For that which is true non-entity,
Page 81 and 82:
oth those who assert that all thing
Page 83 and 84:
to intellect, expanding the winged
Page 85 and 86:
good is not congenial with non-good
Page 87 and 88:
it is requisite that what is first
Page 89 and 90:
that they are susceptive of transmu
Page 91 and 92:
who are not worthy to enter into th
Page 93 and 94:
equisite that evil, as we have freq
Page 95 and 96:
fabrication of things. 3. In the ne
Page 97 and 98:
the soul in generation, and on this
Page 99 and 100:
intellectual perception of itself,
Page 101 and 102: which the soul is filled with folly
Page 103 and 104: the image of the rational soul, mus
Page 105 and 106: aseness of itself, defalcates indee
Page 107 and 108: aseness of matter. For each organ o
Page 109 and 110: [123] ceed] ? If, indeed, each of t
Page 111 and 112: and verges to the earth. For when t
Page 113 and 114: every nature of the infinite from t
Page 115 and 116: says,—if this be the case, we mus
Page 117 and 118: subsistence to itself, and for the
Page 119 and 120: they are what they are; but when ab
Page 121 and 122: [137] also, is contrary to virtue,
Page 123 and 124: survey what evil itself is by itsel
Page 125 and 126: the fountain from which they are ge
Page 127 and 128: everything which perpetually exists
Page 129 and 130: [146] mortal nature, not in consequ
Page 131 and 132: account of another, and, as it were
Page 133 and 134: effective causes of evils, therefor
Page 135 and 136: evil is to be called a parhypostasi
Page 137 and 138: of this, one part of it is differen
Page 139 and 140: c The first monad of forms is what
Page 141 and 142: the energies and the works of evil;
Page 143 and 144: will, and is debile and inefficacio
Page 145 and 146: to turpitude, one kind subsists abo
Page 147 and 148: For this, in the first place, perha
Page 149 and 150: it is not possible for that which c
Page 151: a In Morbeka, in this place, after
show all

PROCLUS, THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?