PROCLUS, THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR

For this, in the first place, perhaps, disturbs the
mind, that evil is in souls. For evil considered
by itself is unmingled with its contrary good, is
most obscure, and nothing else than darkness;
and if it subsisted by itself, it might perhaps be
an impediment to the works of Providence.
But, as we have frequently said, evil is not
unmingled with good, and there is no such
thing as evil itself; since it is in a certain
respect, and not absolutely evil, through its
participation of good. For, in short, it is not the
same thing to say, that. God is the cause of all
things, and that he is alone the cause of all
things [since other causes co-operate with
him]. For the former assertion is true, but the
latter not. For intellect is the cause of the
natures posterior to itself; soul, of the beings
which are consequent to it; and nature, of
bodies, and whatever is inherent in bodies.
Each of these, likewise, produces in a different
way. For God produces primarily, and
according to transcendent union; intellect,
according to an eternal energy; soul, selfmotively;
and nature, through necessity. And
neither is that which produces intellectually the
same with that which is prior to it, nor with that
which is secondary to it, so far as it is
secondary. If, therefore, all things are from
Providence, and no one of all things is evil, so
far as it is from, and is produced by
Providence, why is it wonderful that evil
should have a place among beings, so far as it
subsists from soul? And the [168] same thing,
indeed, will be evil to particulars, but good to
wholes. It will, however, he in a greater degree
evil to particulars, because evil is derived from
them. For not energy alone, but also that which
energises, possesses from Providence an
excellent condition of being. Hence, in a
certain respect good is in them,-—I mean, in
the evils which exist in the soul. And thus it
will be credible that Providence does not suffer
any one of these to be deprived of itself. Evil,