PROCLUS, THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR

obtain is another. And the one is the nature of
good ; but the other is contrary to it. The
generation, therefore, of what is contrary to
good, of whatever kind it may be, arises from
the debility of the efficient, and its
incommensurability to that which is effected.
For we rightly assert that those things have a
subsistence which proceed from a principle,
and have a certain end to which their
progression is directed; but we say that those
things have a deviation from subsistence,
which neither proceed from a principle
according to nature, nor have a definite end.
But evils neither have a principal cause of their
generation,—for neither the nature of that
which is praeter-natural, nor the reason b of
things praeter-rational, is a cause,—nor do they
reach to an end. For everything which is
generated, is generated for the sake of
something [different from itself]. Hence such
3 In Morbeka "parientes," for which it is necessary to
read parturientes : in the Greek odinontes, an
expression much used by Proclus.
b Reason, in the Greek logos, signifies in this place a
productive power, but which, from its imbecility, does
not merit the appellation of a cause.
[155] a generation must be said to be a
deviation from subsistence, imperfect and
without a scope, and also in a certain respect
uncaused and indefinite. For neither is there
one cause of it, nor does that which is a cause
of itself, and a principal cause, effect anything,
looking to evil itself, and the nature of evil. But
the very contrary to this takes place. For
everything which is produced, is produced for
the sake of good; but evil is extrinsically
derived, and is superadvenient. The attainment,
indeed, of that which is appropriate, is to
everything an end; but the unattainment of it
proceeds from the debility of the efficient, so
far as it receives a nature which is partly less
and partly more excellent; and in consequence