PROCLUS, THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR

y its recipients a . For neither would it be
possible to know the things which externally
corrupt, without sense which knows
particulars; nor to desire liquid and solid
aliment, without that part of the soul which is
the source of all-various appetitions; nor to
pursue what is mortal, without the
remembrance of that which is able to hurt or
assist it. By how much better, therefore, it is for
that which is connected with another thing
different from itself, by which also it is perhaps
molested, to be thus connected, sometimes
only, and not always,—by so much more
beneficial is it for the soul, to direct its
attention to the irrational nature, than to
become itself irrational. If, therefore, it is
necessary that the immortal soul should
descend hither, that the mortal soul also should
subsist on account of it,—and the existence of
both these is conformable to the will of
Providence,—if this be the case, the
preternatural also must be referred to the same
bound of Providence, for the sake of that which
is according to nature. Thus too in souls, that
which is preter-rational is for the sake of that
which is according to reason, that which
energises preter-
a The whole of the above which is in italics, is in the
version of Morbeka, " et frustra utique descensus esset,
non jam adjutus ab ipsis suscipientibus ipsum, sed
corruptis." But as Proclus is here speaking of the
rational soul, for adjutus it is necessary to read adjuta ;
for ipsum, ipsam; and for corruptis, corrupta.
b In Morbeka "praeter rationem;" but it is obviously
necessary, from what immediately follows, to read
praeter naturam.
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rationally in us subsisting for the sake of our
rational energy. But respecting this problem
enough has been said at present.
6. Consequent to this, let us direct our attention
to the sixth problem. If Providence exists,—