PROCLUS, THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR

espect to those who are dissimilar in their
habits,—in answer to this inquiry, therefore, it
may I think be said, in the first place, that they
do not suffer what is similar so far as they are
dissimilar, but so far as they are similar; being
willing, perhaps, to inhabit the same city, to
enter the same ship, to engage with others in
the same battles, or act in conjunction with
them in anything else, and, by thus acting,
suffer with them the same calamity. Hence, so
far as some of them are better, and others
worse, they bear the common calamity
differently; the latter, indeed, impatiently, but
the former mildly, though they perish. And
after a separation from the present life, the
abode of more excellent souls receives the
former, but of depraved souls the latter. In the
second place, it may be said, that of such coordinations
of those that are at the same time
saved, or at the same time perish, there is an
order by which they are similarly collected
together in the universe, and a common period
of fate, proceeding from different principles to
the same end. There is likewise a concurrence
of progressions,[57] which are either
preservative or destructive of all; and it is
requisite that of parts, in consequence of their
following wholes, these should effect and
suffer something in conjunction with certain
things, but those with other things of a different
nature; since with us, also, the heart is
sometimes so disposed that a certain part is
copassive, but many parts at another time. In
this universe, likewise, with respect to the less
principal parts, these suffer peculiarly, but
those in common from the more principal
parts; and some suffer nothing from those
things from which others suffer. It is not
wonderful, therefore, that the motions of one of
these should be conformable to Providence, but
those of the other should be from necessity, in
consequence of being subdued by passions.