PROCLUS, THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR

according to a principal cause, or not ? And if
not, whether some kind of essence must be
given to it, or its existence must be considered
to be wholly unsubstantial ? And if it be
admitted that it has some [75] kind of essence,
how does it subsist, there being another
principle [contrary to it] ? And, further still,
how Providence existing, evil exists, and
whence it is derived? In short, all such
particulars must be considered as we are
accustomed in our Commentaries to
investigate.
The beginning, therefore, according to nature,
of the speculation of these things will be,
whether evil ranks among beings or not? But
after what manner is it possible for that to exist,
which is entirely destitute of the principle of
beings ? For neither is it possible for darkness
[so far as it is darkness] to participate of light,
nor vice of virtue, nor evil of good. As,
therefore, if light was the first cause, there
would be no darkness in secondary natures, as
the generation of it would not be from chance,
nor from anything else than the principle of
things; so, because good is the cause of all
things, it is requisite that evil should have no
subsistence among beings. For if it is from
goodness itself, how can the good a be any
longer the cause of all good, when it also
produces the nature of evil? But if it does not
derive its subsistence from the good, the good
will not extend itself to all things, and will not
be the principle of all beings, since evil having
an arrangement among beings, will escape the
progression which is from the good. In short, if
everything which has an essential subsistence,
of whatever kind it may be, derives this
subsistence from
a For "et agathōn" here in Morbeka's version, it is
necessary to read t'agathon