Somalia: Creating Space for Fresh Approaches to Peacebuilding

addressing terrorism: a theory of change approach
As a starting point we must take note that at official levels responses to terrorism
almost exclusively frame the challenge under a political umbrella constructed
by way of either/or choices. Quite commonly we hear key leaders affirm that
they “will never negotiate with terrorists”. This framing comes in the context of a
highly charged political environment and an emotionally laden legacy that follows
the aftermath of mass violence. President George Bush expressed this choice as
defining global partnerships and alliances after the events of September 11, 2001,
when in one of his key speeches he made it clear to the international community
that “you are with us or against us”.
The blanket refusal to engage and negotiate with violent organizations, even
those listed as terrorist, does not match the empirical evidence that engagement
and negotiations have often taken place over the past decades with designated
terrorists. 3 While counterterrorism responses certainly existed prior to 9/11, the
“listing” of designated individuals and groups as foreign terrorists gained salience
and prominence in the weeks and months that followed. 4 For a decade this
approach has marked and defined a strategy of isolation that grew exponentially
to include more and more groups and had an impact on wider civil society and local
communities in a number of key strategic geographies.
The approach to listing has had significant debate. The UN General Assembly
2005 World Summit Outcome document declared that the Security Council and
the Secretary-General should “ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing
individuals and entities on sanctions lists and for removing them, as well as
for granting humanitarian exemptions”. 5 In 2009 Eminent Jurists Panel of the
International Commission of Jurists described the listing and delisting procedures
used by numerous nations and international agencies as “arbitrary” and
discriminatory. It is a system, said the Panel, “unworthy” of international institutions
such as the UN and the EU. 6
Legal issues aside, the most difficult theoretical issue posed by designated listings,
emerge in the bifurcation affecting whole populations. We live in a far more
complex world than one divided into two cells. A starting point for any theoretical
exploration requires a careful look at this complexity and the many settings where
designated foreign terrorist lists exist as defined by the US and Europe.
In particular, the listing of organizations rarely clarifies how far the net of affiliation
may be cast. While there are many reasons for this ambiguity a primary
one has to do with the nature of these organizations. More often than not they are
organized on loose but highly effective networks. They function by way of smaller
independent nodes of operation with unclear hierarchies of power, strategy and
decision-making. They have highly protective and secretive communicative
systems. Perhaps most importantly they embed themselves around a wider set of
affiliations and crosscutting relationships within the societies where they live. In
locations like South-Central Somalia these listings by their very nature implicate
entire geographies, human and physical and create significant difficulty for distinguishing
where exactly the boundary of relationships begins and ends making
it difficult to know with whom it is acceptable to relate. The impact of such list-
3 In particular see the Rand
report by Seth and Labicki, 2008;
Toros, 2008, Neumann, 2007;
and Zartman, 1990. All point to
cases, approaches, successes and
failures of directly negotiating with
terrorists.
4 It should be noted that when lists
initially emerged in the UN in 1990
they promoted a smart sanction
with the objective to impact key
leaders in Iraq and avoid, to the
degree possible, hardships on the
wider civil society. Post 9/11 listings
lost their narrow focus and grew
exponentially in the designated
foreign terrorist lists of the US
and EU.
5 United Nations General
Assembly, Resolution Adopted by the
General Assembly 60/1: 2005 World
Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1, New
York, 24 October 2005, para. 109.
6 International Commission of
Jurists, Assessing Damage, Urging
Action: Report of the Eminent Jurists
Panel on Terrorism, Counter-
Terrorism and Human Rights
(Geneva: International Commission
of Jurists, 2009), 116–117.
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