Somalia: Creating Space for Fresh Approaches to Peacebuilding

civilian support and the foundations of al-shabaab expansion
from working with clans in a similar fashion, restricting influence largely to the
Mogadishu area
However, such organizations will continue to be weak because they rely on,
rather than override, clan loyalties. Al-Shabaab’s governance structures will not
develop further while strong clan loyalties shape the development of Sharia
courts and the provision of other services. 15 Additionally, it faces growing resentment
from civilians in the areas it controls, even though it has brought stability
to those regions. In the same manner as support for the Revolutionary United
Front in Sierra Leone and other rebel organizations emerged and subsequently
declined, al-Shabaab’s harsh application of Islamic law and forced recruitment,
especially of children, feeds resentment. 16
It would be easy to assume that the support for al-Shabaab arises primarily
from the security and stability it provides, the few governance services it engages
in, and ideological resonance with segments of the Muslim faith. However, it is a
mistake to overlook the role that violence has played in sustaining civilian support
for the organization. Violence against civilians and the coercive use of the
Sharia courts is heaviest in regions where territorial control is contested. There
are instances where violence seems directed against potential rivals rather than
justice being administered equally. 17 Such evidence fits the model of strategic
violence prevalent in the civil war literature. It is probable that misuse of courts
and other forms of coercion will continue at high levels so long as al-Shabaab
occupies contested areas.
In areas contested by both al-Shabaab and TFG/AMISOM forces, the
actions of the latter are often restricted by insufficient information, resulting
in broad targeting strategies and indiscriminate violence against civilians.
Al-Shabaab has been able to take advantage of this by intentionally launching
mortar rounds against AMISOM and TFG positions from densely populated
areas in the hopes AMISOM and TFG forces will respond with artillery fire,
killing numerous civilians. 18 This strategy has helped portray the TFG as a
non-credible provider of security and created civilian backlash. Even though
the deaths can be partially attributed to the tactics al-Shabaab has adopted, it
has gained civilian support nonetheless. The strategy appears to have worked
in portraying al-Shabaab as a better guarantee of security than the TFG,
even though the recent expansion of the TFG/AMISOM controlled area in
Mogadishu is leading to a shift in military tactics from all sides. Coupled with
the nationalistic support al-Shabaab was able to count on while Ethiopian forces
remained inside Somalia, this helped sustain the movement’s civilian support
in the face of the atrocities it has perpetrated.
Observations and recommendations
1. Because authority is easily constituted in South-Central Somalia,
peacemakers19 and the international community should seek to engage with
relevant actors, rather than supplant them or rely on regional powers. Because
it will be difficult to extend state control in any meaningful manner for the
15 Mampilly finds support for
his hypothesis that governance
structures are less effective
when rebel organization is more
fractured. Melissa Simpson argues
that the original ICU courts were
products of the clan structure in
Mogadishu and will continue to be
shaped by clan loyalties. Simpson,
Melissa. 2009. An Islamic Solution
to State Failure in Somalia?
Geopolitics of the Middle East 2(1):
31-49.
16 Human Rights Watch. 2010.
“Harsh War, Harsh Peace: Abuses
by al-Shabaab, the Transitional
Federal Government, and AMISOM
in Somalia.”
17 Human Rights Watch has
documented numerous such
incidents. Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 By peacemakers I mean
individuals and organizations
working on top-down mediation
efforts.
31